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HEY, CHRISTIANS, LEAVE YOUR KIDS 
ALONE! 
Stephen G. Gilles1 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS v. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS. By 
James G. Dwyer.2 Cornell University Press. 1998. Pp. 204. 
INTRODUCTION 
The end may at last be in sight for the long-running estab-
lishment clause battle over state aid to families who send their 
children to religious schools. Earlier this year, in Jackson v. 
Benson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the Establish-
ment Clause permits states to provide parents of school-age 
children with tuition vouchers redeemable at the private school 
of their choice-even if that school provides a religious educa-
tion.3 Although the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in 
Jackson,4 the fact that similar cases are pending in three other 
states suggests that the Court will probably issue a definitive 
ruling on the constitutionality of vouchers sometime within the 
next few years.5 
1. Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Thanks to Dean Neil Co-
gan for research support, to Stephen Arons, Brian Bix, Laurie N. Feldman, Abner 
Greene, Gary Jones, Sanford Levinson, Gregory Loken, Leonard Long, Nelson Lund, 
Martin Margulies, Linda Meyer, David Rosettenstein, Elmer John Thiessen and partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at Quinnipiac for helpful comments, and to Pink Floyd for 
inspiring the title. Pink Floyd, Another Brick in the Wall, The Wall (Columbia 1987) 
("Hey, Teacher, leave those kids alone!"). 
2. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wyoming. 
3. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,607 (Wis. 1998). 
4. Jackson v. Benson (No. 98-376, 1998 WL 596682), cert. denied, 67 USLW 3322 
(Nov. 9, 1998). 
5. In the Ohio case, the Ohio Court of Appeals struck down Cleveland's voucher 
plan, Simons-Harris v. Goff (Ohio App. lOth Div.), 1997 WL 217583 (May 1, 1997) (un-
pub.) and that ruling is currently on appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. In the Vermont 
case, the trial court held that Vermont's rule that towns without public schools may re-
imburse families for tuition payments to private schools, but not religious ones, was re-
quired by the Establishment Clause and not forbidden by the Free Exercise Clause. 
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The constitutional controversy over vouchers is not simply a 
referendum on whether religious schools are good or bad. The 
conflicting interests of taxpayers, teachers, subgroups of differ-
ently situated parents, and other groups play a large part, as do 
principled disagreements about how best to interpret the Estab-
lishment Clause. Clearly, however, the ways in which people 
understand both their own interests and the meaning of the Es-
tablishment Clause are very much influenced by their divergent 
judgments about the merits of religious schools compared with 
secular public ones. As voucher proponents see it, religious 
schools (unfettered by the Establishment Clause) are better at 
providing much-needed moral and character education, and the 
low-cost exit option vouchers give parents will force public 
schools to become better, safer, and less wasteful. In contrast, 
voucher opponents worry that vouchers will result in the flight of 
education-conscious families from public schools and lead to the 
proliferation of divisively sectarian religious schools. Despite 
their reservations about a system in which religious schooling is 
the norm rather than the exception, however, mainstream oppo-
nents of vouchers accept-or at least do not explicitly question-
the legitimacy and constitutionality of parentally-chosen relig-
ious schooling as it now exists throughout the United States. 
None of the major groups in the anti-voucher coalition calls for 
the abolition of parents' constitutional rights to decide whether 
and what kind of religious education their children shall receive. 
And although thoughtful observers continue to debate whether 
our ongoing educational crisis is essentially confined to low-
income, inner-city public schools, or also includes more affluent 
suburban and rural school districts, it has not occurred to anyone 
to suggest that the real crisis lies in the religious schools that 
educate the overwhelming majority of children who attend non-
public schools. 
Until now. In the eyes of James G. Dwyer, conservative re-
ligious schools compose a vast Gulag peopled by children unfor-
tunate enough to be born into traditionalist religious families. 6 It 
is high time, he argues in Religious Schools v. Children's Rights, 
that we deploy the force of law to prevent religious parents from 
Chittenden Town School District v. Vermont Dept. of Ed., No. S0478-96 (Rutland 
County Superior Court, June 27, 1997). In the Maine case, the trial court rejected free 
exercise and equal protection challenges to Maine's tuitioning plan, reasoning that the 
Establishment Clause forbids payment of tuition at religious schools. Bagley v. Maine 
Dept. of Ed., Docket No. CV-97-484 (April20, 1988). 
6. Throughout this essay, I will use "conservative" and "traditionalist" inter-
changeably when speaking of religion and religious persons. 
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robbing their children of the high-quality secular education that 
citizenship in our society entitles them to.7 Indeed, Dwyer 
claims that the Constitution requires states to intervene to pro-
tect children from the harmful practices of traditionalist religious 
schools (and parents). He contends, among other things, (1) that 
parental childrearing rights are illegitimate and should be abol-
ished, (2) that states must regulate childrearing solely by refer-
ence to what is in children's best interests, (3) that the Estab-
lishment Clause requires states to determine children's best 
interests by focusing exclusively on their temporal interests, ( 4) 
that states must therefore forbid parents to make religiously-
based childrearing decisions that run counter to their children's 
temporal interests, (5) that the Equal Protection Clause requires 
states to apply all child-welfare legislation to every child, re-
gardless of the religious beliefs of the child or the child's parents, 
(6) that all state education regulation that seeks to advance chil-
dren's best interests must therefore be applied to religious 
schools, (7) that the practices of conservative religious schools 
(and parents) are harmful to children's temporal interests in a 
variety of important ways, and (8) that the Constitution there-
fore requires states to intervene to dismantle these practices. 
Specifically, religious schools should be forbidden to employ un-
certified teachers, to use corporal punishment, to teach that 
premarital sex is categorically wrong, to espouse traditional gen-
der roles or other "sexist teaching," to teach secular subjects 
from a religious perspective, to disparage persons of other faiths, 
and to teach children that they will be "saved" only if they con-
form to "unreasonable" religious standards of conduct.8 
Dwyer recognizes that these proposals would "so radically 
alter" the nature of religious schools "as to make them unrecog-
nizable."9 But he declares this to be "cause for celebration, be-
cause any form of schooling that systematically violates the 
rights of children should not exist." 10 Moreover, he suggests that 
there is a silver lining for religious schools: provided they abide 
7. Portions of Dwyer's book draw on and develop arguments he initially presented 
in two earlier law review articles. See James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Re-
ligious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection 
to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321 (1996); James G. Dwyer, Par-
ents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 Cal. 
L. Rev. 1371 (1994). 
8. James G. Dwyer, Religious Schools vs. Children's Rights, 179 (Cornell U. Press, 
1998). 
9. Id. at 180. 
10. !d. 
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by his prescriptions, they can continue to offer religious instruc-
tion and ceremonies-so long as these are truly optional." Best 
of all, once religious schools have been suitably purged of all 
"practices inconsistent with the temporal well-being of their stu-
dents, the state should be free to let ~ublic funds be used to pay 
for children to attend these schools." 2 Thus, provided the state 
forces religious schools to conform to its judgments about chil-
dren's temporal best interests, vouchers for religious education 
(that is, what's left of it) are perfectly constitutional! 
Now, whatever the Supreme Court ultimately decides to do 
about vouchers, we can be quite sure it will not lift this page 
from Dwyer's radical playbook. Dwyer-who pulls no punches 
in his criticisms of the Court's childrearing jurisprudence-
knows this full well. In making the case for his various 
revolutionary proposals, he is pursuing a long-run strategy, 
seeking to persuade an academic audience that will in tum 
influence the rising generation of lawyers, judges-and law 
clerks. To that end, he has written a forceful, spirited, and 
creatively argued book that deserves serious and rigorous 
evaluation. 
Moreover, at least within the academy, Dwyer's cause is by 
no means a hopeless one. His theses will strike a receptive chord 
with law professors, many of whom are deeply suspicious of re-
ligious conservatives (and very few of whom actually are relig-
ious conservatives).13 Law professors commonly think that re-
ligious traditionalists are either outright hostile to fundamental 
liberal values such as the rule of law, democratic governance, 
and civil and political equality, or grudgingly profess allegiance 
to them for prudential reasons. The widespread belief in legal 
academic circles about religious traditionalists roughly parallels 
what political conservatives have long said about Communists: 
these people will take advantage of liberal democratic freedoms 
until they come to power, and then they will commence the 
elimination of those freedoms. Moreover, many law professors 
see religious traditionalists-especially Christian Fundamental-
ists-as extremists whose beliefs and practices are irrational, 
without value, and positively dangerous to themselves and oth-
11. ld. 
12. Id. at 181. 
13. According to the 1998 General Social Survey conducted by the National Opin-
ion Research Center, 28.5% of adult Americans identify themselves as religious tradi-
tionalists. It seems safe to assert that the percentage of American law professors who 
would place themselves in that category is closer to zero than to 28.5%. Thanks to James 
Lindgren for alerting me to this data. 
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ers. The dispositions these opinions induce are not limited to 
preventing religious traditionalists from gaining government 
power; they also include using government power to counter and 
undermine religious traditionalism as a movement. The gist of 
this sentiment is, "Why tolerate the intolerant?" In a sense, 
therefore, Dwyer is simply saying explicitly, and attempting to 
provide a theoretical foundation for, what many academics (and 
other intellectuals) have long felt about 'the Religious Right.' 
Yet a strong countervailing tendency is also evident in much 
liberal thinking. The principle that government should be toler-
ant and neutral in its treatment of competing reasonable concep-
tions of the good life-and slow to conclude that a widely-
practiced way of life is unreasonable-has led many scholars, in-
cluding the influential political and legal philosopher John 
Rawls, to seek ways of accomodating and tolerating religious 
traditionalists in matters of childrearing.14 Even Amy Gutmann, 
who advocates a strong conception of democratic education that 
clashes with conservative religious education on many issues, is 
prepared to recognize a large realm within which religious 
schools and parents are free to instruct children in accord with 
their religious values and beliefs.15 Similarly, while there is 
plenty of controversy among constitutional scholars about the 
scope of parents' constitutional rights to control the religious 
education of their children, it is safe to say that the core holdings 
of the Court's leading parental-rights cases-Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters16 and Wisconsin v. Yoder17 -still enjoy widespread support 
among constitutional scholars. 
Dwyer argues that this liberal tendency to favor pluralism 
and toleration, whatever its merits as applied to the self-
regarding behavior of religious adults, has no proper application 
to decisions by religious parents concerning their children's lives: 
"the value of toleration is simply irrelevant, in the context of 
children's education."18 In his view, Rawls and other liberals 
have fallen into the same fundamental error that infects the Su-
preme Court's childrearing decisions: failing to see children as 
distinct persons whose interests are entitled to equal weight with 
14. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 199-200 (Columbia U. Press, 1993). 
15. See Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education 41-43, 69-70, 115-23 (Princeton U. 
Press, 1987); Robert K. Fullinwider, ed., Public Education in a Multicultural Society: 
Policy, Theory, Critique 156-79 (Cambridge U. Press, 1996). 
16. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
17. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
18. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 152 (cited in note 8). 
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those of adults. 19 By exploring the implications of recognizing 
children's best interests as the proper foundation for regulation 
of childrearing, Dwyer hopes to show that Rawls's minimalist 
view of what society can demand from traditionalist parents 
violates Rawls's own principle of equal respect for persons.20 
In this review essay, I offer a critique and refutation of each 
of Dwyer's main theses. Readers should know up front that my 
previous writings stake out a position diametrically opposite to 
Dwyer's about what type of childrearing regime is in children's 
best interests.21 Rather than abolishing parental rights and sub-
jecting the decisions of religious parents to extensive regulation 
and oversight, I have argued that it is in children's best interests 
to preserve-and even expand-parents' traditional constitu-
tional rights to direct and control the education of their children. 
In a nutshell, the "liberal parentalism" to which I subscribe holds 
that states should defer to parental childrearing decisions unless 
the parents' view of their child's best interests is plainly unrea-
sonable. Thus, in the run of parent-state conflicts over chil-
drearing- in which the state and the parents hold conflicting but 
reasonable views of the child's best interests-the parents' 
judgment should prevail.22 
My principal goal in this essay, however, is not to restate my 
own views (though there is inevitably some of that) but to en-
gage Dwyer's arguments and examine his premises. The essay is 
divided into four parts, each of which addresses one of Dwyer's 
central theses. Part I addresses Dwyer's arguments for abolish-
ing parental rights and moving to a regime of limited parental 
privileges, subject to de novo judicial review based on the child's 
temporal interests. I argue that Dwyer misunderstands the 
scope and purpose of traditional parental rights, which authorize 
parents to decide what is in their child's best interests, not to 
wield arbitrary power over them; that he mistakenly assumes 
that government agents, including judges, can be trusted to dis-
cover and pursue children's best interests; and that he fails to 
grasp the implications of the fact-which he does not dispute-
that parents generally know their children better, and care more 
19. Compare id. at 152 (criticizing liberal theorists) with id. at 138 (criticizing the 
Supreme Court). 
20. Id. at 175. 
21. See Stephen G. Gilles, Liberal Parentalism and Children's Educational Rights, 
26 Capital U. L. Rev. 9 (1997); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist 
Manifesto, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 937 (1996). 
22. See Gilles, 26 Capital U. L. Rev. at 19-20 (cited in note 21); Gilles, 63 U. Chi. L 
Rev. at 945-72 (cited in note 21). 
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hat parents generally know their children better, and care more 
about their well-being, than public officials can or do. 
Part II evaluates Dwyer's claim that traditionalist religious 
education is incompatible with the best understanding of chil-
dren's temporal interests. I argue that Dwyer's attempt to de-
rive a conception of children's temporal interests from a Rawl-
sian Original Position analysis fails, because he wrongly assumes 
that there is only one reasonable view-the secular, rationalist, 
egalitarian one-on a wide range of controversial issues about 
what is in children's temporal best interests. Dwyer fails to grasp 
the powerful secular reasons that support the religiously-
ordained childrearing practices he condemns. (For example, 
teaching children that premarital sex is categorically wrong is 
perfectly defensible in terms of the long-run best interests of 
young men and women.) Thus, his claim that his account of 
children's best interests will rely only on "more-or-less 
uncontested" secular values23 -a claim that is essential to the 
Rawlsian mode of reasoning he employs-is simply false. 
Part Ill considers Dwyer's claim that the Establishment 
Clause forbids states to allow religious parents-or their chil-
dren- to choose traditionalist religious education as presently 
constituted. His fundamental mistake here is to treat a state's 
neutral decision to allow all parents, religious or secular, to de-
cide what kind of education their children shall receive, as a 
form of forbidden aid to religion. Although Dwyer writes as if 
this bizarre interpretation of the Establishment Clause is self-
evidently correct, in fact it has no support in Supreme Court 
precedent or constitutional scholarship. And his assertion that 
the Establishment Clause forbids states to allow parents (or 
children) to make religiously-based choices contrary to chil-
dren's temporal interests rests on precisely the sort of judgment 
the Establishment Clause does bar states from making-namely, 
that a widely-practiced religious way of life is "clearly irra-
tional." 
Part IV takes up Dwyer's contention that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause prohibits religious exemptions from state educa-
tional laws that are intended to promote children's best interests. 
I argue that the demands of formal equality are satisfied because 
each child's parents are authorized to decide which sort of edu-
cation is in that child's best interests-one that accepts the 
state's substantive educational standards or one that rejects them 
23. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 151 (cited in note 8). 
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for religious reasons. Dwyer's further assertion that religious 
schools should be forbidden to engage in what he calls "sexist 
teaching" (namely, the view that traditional gender roles are 
best) is wrong because he fails to show that such teaching is 
harmful to girls or boys, let alone that it is the sort of invidious 
discrimination with which the Equal Protection Clause is con-
cerned-or for which states can fairly be held responsible. Fi-
nally, state censorship of "sexist teaching," like most of Dwyer's 
specific proposals for regulating religious education, plainly con-
stitutes content-based regulation of the speech of religious 
schools, teachers and parents to the children they are educating. 
The First Amendment, however, flatly prohibits government 
from forbidding the teaching of ideas with which the majority 
disagrees. 
I. SHOULD PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
PARENT ALIST PRESUMPTION BE ABOLISHED? 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF DWYER'S ARGUMENT FOR ABOLISHING 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Dwyer's first major thesis is that traditional parental rights 
are illegitimate because they give parents plenary power to con-
trol the lives of other persons (namely, their children). He rec-
ognizes that some scholars think parental rights are necessary to 
protect children's interests, and he appears to agree with two of 
the reasons they cite: that young children need adult governance, 
and that the "optimal upbringing for a child involves an intimate, 
continuous relationship with a single set of parents that is largely 
insulated from interference by third parties."24 He is more cau-
tious about the third reason-he describes it as the "conven-
tional wisdom" that "parents are in the best position to know 
what is best for their children and are likely to care more than 
anyone else about their children's well-being"25 - but he does not 
deny that it is true. 
Instead, he argues that even assuming that all three reasons 
are unqualifiedly true, they do not justify giving parents the arbi-
trary power to control the lives of their children in harmful 
ways.2 Yet, he says, that is precisely what parental rights have 
24. !d. at 81. 
25. !d. 
26. !d. See also id. at 47-54. 
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traditionally meant, and still mean today. Parents' fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause entitle them to make deci-
sions about their children's lives even when they hold a selfish or 
mistaken view of their children's temporal best interests.27 Par-
ents' rights under the Free Exercise Clause are even more inimi-
cal to children's welfare: religious parents are routinely allowed 
to inflict temporal harm on their children in order to comply 
with otherworldly religious beliefs.28 
Parental rights of this kind, Dwyer argues, are inconsistent 
with the principle that "no individual is entitled to use another, 
nonconsenting person as an instrument to advance his own in-
terests, free from interference by the state or other third par-
ties."29 This principle applies with full force to children, because 
they are equal persons entitled to be treated as ends, not means, 
and to have their interests given equal weight with those of other 
persons in all decisions affecting them.30 What is needed, he 
says, is a child-centered approach that will fully protect chil-
dren's interests without the need for parental rights. Instead of 
balancing parental rights against society's interests, courts re-
solving parent-state conflicts over childrearing should ask 
whether parental decisions are in the child's best interests.31 
Parents would retain privileges to nurture, educate and discipline 
their children, provided they did so in ways consistent with the 
state's judgments about children's best interests;32 and children 
would enjoy the right-which their parents could assert on their 
behalf-to be free from inap~ropriate state interference with 
parents' childrearing decisions. 3 But rather than presuming that 
parental decisions are in the child's best interests, as they do 
now, courts would "determine as best they could which out-
come- that which the parent recommends or that which the 
state recommends-is more consistent with the rights and tem-
poral interests of the child, taking into account any costs to the 
child arising from the state's restricting parents' freedom."34 
27. I d. at 47. 
28. ld. at 59-60. 
29. Id. at 67. 
30. Id. 
31. I d. at 65. 
32. I d. at 64. 
33. Id. 
34. ld. at 86. 
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B. PARENTAL RIGHTS PROMOTE CHILDREN'S BEST 
INTERESTS, NOT ARBITRARY PARENTAL POWER 
Dwyer's call for the abolition of traditional parental rights is 
premised on a gross mischaracterization of their scope and ra-
tionale. Neither state common law nor federal constitutional law 
gives parents the "plenary power" Dwyer alleges they wield over 
their children.35 Parental authority to make decisions about the 
child's life even over the child's objections ends when the child 
attains majority, and is limited by the ubiquitous prohibitions on 
parental abuse and neglect. It has never been the law that pa-
rental childrearing rights constitute "an entitlement to control 
another person simply for the sake of exercising such control-
that is, abstracted from any particular objectives that such 
control might serve."36 On the contrary, as the Supreme Court 
explained in Parham v. J.R., our legal tradition endorses parents' 
authority to direct the upbringing of their children precisely 
because it "historically ... has recognized that natural bonds of 
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children. "37 Parental rights are a means to the end of protecting 
the best interests of children, not a license for parents arbitrarily 
to control their children's lives. 
The common law judgment that parents are the persons 
most likely to act in their children's best interests38 also underlies 
what the Parham Court approvingly referred to as the "tradi-
tional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of 
their child."39 I call this the "parentalist presumption," because it 
gives parents the lion's share of childrearing authority: the state 
may not override a parental decision unless it overcomes the 
presumption and demonstrates that the parents' choice is in fact 
harmful to the child. In the famous Pierce trilogy,40 the Supreme 
35. Id. at 68. 
36. ld. 
37. 442 U.S. 584,602 (1979). See also Note, 126 U. Pa. L Rev. 1135, 1142 (1978) 
(common law presumed that the religious [or other] preferences of the parents constitute 
the child's best interest). 
38. See, e.g., James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 159 (0. Halsted, 1827) 
('"[t]he wants and weaknesses of children render it necessary that some person maintain 
them, and the voice of nature has pointed out the parent as the most fit and proper per-
son"). 
39. 442 U.S. at 604. See, e.g., Joseph Story, 2 Commentaries on Equity Jurispru-
dence§ 1341 (Cambridge U. Press, 1836 ed.) (parental custody and control of children is 
based on "'the natural presumption, that the children will be properly taken care of, and 
brought up with a due education"). 
40. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). 
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Court constitutionalized one version of the parentalist presump-
tion by giving parents a substantive due process right to direct 
and control the education of their children. And in Wisconsin v. 
Yoder,41 the Court constitutionalized a narrower but stronger 
version of that presumption by upholding parents' free exercise 
right to direct and control the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren.42 
The rationale of these two lines of Supreme Court parental-
rights cases is not, as Dwyer asserts, "simply that parents have 
traditionally held such control."43 As we have already seen, that 
tradition rests on the clearly-articulated judgment that parental 
control is in children's best interests-a judgment the Supreme 
Court expressly endorsed in Parham. Consistent with that ra-
tionale, the Court's cases make clear that parents' constitutional 
childrearing rights may not be exercised in ways that are plainly 
harmful to children's welfare. In Meyer, the Court reasoned that 
for children to learn a foreign language at their parents' behest 
"has been commonly looked upon as helpful and desirable," and 
"cannot reasonably be regarded as harmful."44 In Pierce, the 
Court struck down Oregon's compulsory public education law 
because it effectively banned private primary schooling-an 
"undertaking not inherently harmful, but long regarded as useful 
and meritorious" -and therefore invaded parents' right to direct 
their children's education.45 In Farrington, the Court struck 
down intrusive state regulations of private schools because they 
"would deprive parents of fair opportunity to procure for their 
children instruction which they think important and we cannot 
say is harmful. "46 In Yoder, the Court stated that parental rights 
would be subject to limitation "even when linked to a free exer-
cise claim ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize 
the health or safety of the child," and ruled in favor of the Amish 
parents only because the "record strongly indicate[ d] that ac-
41. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
42. I have argued that because parentally-chosen education consists in communi-
cating messages and ideas to children, in many educational contexts state interference 
with parents' educational choices infringes their free speech rights. See Gilles, 63 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. at 1012-33 (cited in note 21). Because the state bears the heavy burden of justi-
fying content-based regulation of free speech, parental free speech rights can also be seen 
as a constitutionalization of the parentalist presumption. 
43. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 80 (cited in note 8). 
44. 262 U.S. at 400. 
45. 268 U.S. at 534. 
46. 273 U.S. at 298. 
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cornmodating [their] religious objections ... will not impair the 
physical or mental health of the child." 47 
Dwyer turns a blind eye to these consistent and unambigu-
ous pronouncements. He complains that in Yoder children's 
best interests were "clearly subordinated to parental preferences 
and in fact had no place in the Court's moral and legal reason-
ing. "48 It is true that the Yoder Court did not frame the issue in 
terms of the best interests of Amish children. But it is a glaring 
non sequitur to infer that children's welfare was irrelevant to the 
decision. As we have just seen, Yoder expressly rests on a find-
ing that the state failed to demonstrate that Amish children were 
harmed by receiving an Amish education rather than a conven-
tional one. As such, Yoder, along with the Court's other paren-
tal rights cases, can be seen as an application of the parentalist 
presumption: parents' educational judgment prevails unless the 
state demonstrates harm to the child with sufficient convincing-
ness to overcome that presumption. The purpose of that pre-
sumption, however, is to enhance the overall welfare of children, 
not to license parental mistakes.49 
Dwyer's failure to identify and address the actual rationale 
for strong parental rights is compounded by his failure to distin-
guish between parental authority and parental power. Parental 
rights do not entitle parents to subject their children to arbitrary, 
selfish, harmful parental choices, even if they possess the raw 
power to do so. Parents are supposed to exercise their chil-
drearing rights in their children's interests as they conceive them; 
and the law supposes that parents generally will honor this obli-
gation.50 Inevitably, some parents will misuse their childrearing 
rights in ways harmful to their children, and the parentalist pre-
sumption makes it less likely that these wrongs will be corrected. 
But by the same token the parentalist presumption makes it 
47. 406 U.S. at 233-34. 
48. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 51 (cited in note 8). 
49. Nor do parental rights deny the "equal personhood" of children, defined as "the 
basic assumption that children are persons and that morally they are equal persons," en-
dowed with "a right to be treated as ends in themselves, rather than as mere means to the 
fulfillment of others' ends, and a right to have their interests considered equally with in-
terests of other persons in the formation of laws and social policy." Id. at 67. The paren-
talist presumption is entirely compatible with treating children as ends rather than 
means, and giving equal weight to their interests. If anything, it is a denial of children's 
equal personhood not to entrust their upbringing to the persons most likely to treat them 
as ends and give equal weight to their interests: their parents. 
50. Parents should, of course, also give appropriate consideration to the interests of 
other family members, including the parents themselves. Dwyer agrees that this qualifi-
cation is appropriate. ld. at 85. 
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more likely that the wrongs done to children by misguided state 
intervention in parental decisionmaking will be avoided. The 
relevant question is not whether robust parental rights are per-
fect when measured by the yardstick of children's best interests, 
but whether they are superior to alternative regimes that give 
the state more control over children's upbringing. 51 
To this question, the longstanding answer of our legal tradi-
tion has been that state authority over childrearing is more to be 
feared than comparable authority in the hands of parents. 
"[P]arents as the natural guardians of their children [are] the 
persons under natural conditions having the most effective mo-
tives and inclinations and being in the best position and under 
the strongest obligations to give to such children proper nurture, 
education, and training. "52 The parentalist presumption reflects 
an underlying societal judgment about how best to enforce the 
child-centered purposes for which both parental childrearing 
authority and state child-protecting authority exist. In light of 
the likelihood that intrusive state oversight of family life would 
on balance reduce children's welfare, our society's enforcement 
strategy relies primarily on parents' love for their children, on 
the child's voice within the family, and on persuasion by public 
and expert opinion (e.g., legions of parents consulting the latest 
edition of Dr. Spock), and only secondarily on courts and child 
welfare agencies. Contrary to Dwyer's complaints, in child-
rearing cases the courts have "focused on whether, for the child, 
the costs of such state action would exceed the costs of leaving 
parents unconstrained. "53 The answer they have consistently 
given, however-that state intervention is likely to do more 
51. The character of parents' incentives to act in their children's best interests may 
vary depending on a variety of factors, including cultural norms, legal rules, and eco-
nomic and social circumstances. For example, parents today are less likely to be depend-
ent on their children in old age than they were before Social Security, and hence in this 
respect their incentives have weakened. I cannot here pursue the important question of 
what we can and should do to optimize parents' incentives. My point is simply that, tak-
ing parenting as it is currently structured in our society, parents generally have better 
incentives to act in the best interests of their children than do agents of the state, be they 
teachers, social workers, or judges. 
52. Wisconsin Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark County, 79 N.W. 422, 428 (Wis. 1899). 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphatically reaffirmed this reasoning in its recent deci-
sion permitting parents to use vouchers for religious schooling. See Jackson v. Benson, 
578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) cert. denied, 67 USLW 3322 (Nov. 9, 1998). See also, e.g., 
Trustees of Schools v. The People, 87 Ill. 303, 308 (1877) (the parent's "natural affections 
and superior opportunities of knowing the physical and mental capabilities and future 
prospects of his child, will insure the adoption of that course which will most effectually 
promote the child's welfare"). 
53. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 81 (cited in note 8). 
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harm than good in light of parents' superior incentives to act in 
the child's best interest-is not the one he wants to hear. 
C. THE REAL ISSUE: PARENTAL OR STATE CONTROL OF 
CHILD REARING? 
Despite his stubborn refusal to admit that courts believe pa-
rental rights are necessary to protect children's best interests, 
Dwyer acknowledges that some legal scholars have made pre-
cisely this argument. 54 In response, he argues that protection for 
children could be achieved without relying on parental rights: 
children could be given "positive rights" to care and education 
from their parents, and "a negative right" (which their parents 
could assert on their behalf) against state interference that 
would adversely affect their interests.55 As a technical matter, I 
am inclined to agree- though it does not follow that parental 
rights should be abolished, because they may also be needed to 
protect the best interests of parents.56 But why attach such over-
riding importance to this formality? Dwyer himself points out 
that "eliminating parents' rights would not in and of itself permit 
or encourage any increase in the level of restrictions [on par-
ents]."57 We could approximate the current legal distribution of 
childrearing authority (while simultaneously abolishing parental 
rights) by giving children a "right" to be governed by their par-
ents' judgments absent a showing of harm strong enough to 
overcome the parentalist presumption. 58 
As this analysis suggests, Dwyer's real quarrel with our ex-
isting childrearing regime concerns parental authority versus 
governmental authority, not children's rights versus parent's 
rights. We currently have a regime in which parents presump-
54. !d. 
55. !d. at 84-85. 
56. Far more than fiduciaries, trustees, and others responsible for advancing the 
best interests of another person, parents may have rights of their own in what is, after all, 
a mutually beneficial relationship, and those rights may be good against various forms of 
interference by the state or third parties. Full exploration of this question is beyond the 
scope of this essay. But to get a sense for its importance, consider Robert Mnookin's 
observation that most people would consider it "monstrously unjust" to transfer custody 
of an infant from competent, loving biological parents to would-be adoptive parents on 
the grounds that "the child's 'life chances' would be greater" if placed with the latter. 
Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Inde-
terminacy, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226,268 (Summer, 1975). 
57. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 89 (cited in note 8). 
58. I do not claim that the rhetorical differences between legally equivalent "paren-
tal rights" and "children's rights" would make no difference at all. It might well be, as 
Dwyer surely hopes, that switching to the language of children's rights would tend, over 
time, to erode support for broad parental authority over children. 
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tively get to decide what is best for their children, and in which 
the state intervenes only to prevent parents from making plainly 
harmful choices on their behalf. Dwyer wants a regime in which 
the state plays a primary role in deciding what is best for chil-
dren, intervening whenever parents make choices at odds with 
the state's judgments about childrearing.59 To that end, he pro-
poses that courts should decide disputes between parents and 
the state without presuming that parents' decisions are in the 
best interests of their children.60 
Dwyer claims to have steered a middle course between tra-
ditional parental rights and making children "'creatures of the 
state,"' thereby effectuating "the belief that children are no 
one's creatures."61 But by authorizing courts-that is, one 
branch of the government-to determine de novo whether pa-
rental childrearing decisions are in children's best interests, his 
proposals would make the state, not parents, the dominant 
player in childrearing.62 And his attempt to claim the moral high 
ground (if such it be) of children's liberation is preposterous. 
Far from allowing children to control their own lives, Dwyer 
wants courts to override parental childrearing choices even if the 
children agree with them, and he urges that children not be al-
lowed to make such decisions for themselves.63 The only "right" 
Dwyer thinks children should have is the inalienable right to be 
raised in accordance with whatever the state and its courts de-
termine to be in their best interests. 
These positions are deeply inconsistent with Dwyer's asser-
tions that parental rights entail anomalous and illegitimate con-
trol over children's lives. Our legal system does not give the 
state rights arbitrarily to control the lives of persons, any more 
59. See id. at 65 ("courts would require a showing not that parents have inflicted 
grievous harm on a child but that the benefits to the child of restricting the parents out-
weigh any costs to the child of intruding upon family life"). On its face, Dwyer's test rec-
ognizes that overriding parental decisions may impose costs on children, and purports to 
take those costs into account. In practice, however, it is difficult to believe that courts-
having already concluded that parents are acting contrary to the child's best interests-
will often refuse to intervene in order to avoid the "costs to the child of intruding upon 
family life." Consequently, although Dwyer's position is marginally less harmful with 
this qualification than without it, the central problem -zero deference to parental 
judgment- remains. 
60. !d. at 86. 
61. Jd. at 178. 
62. Dwyer agrees that his approach would "likely alter to a substantial degree the 
limits of parental freedom and authority and the boundaries of permissible state action." 
ld. at 65. 
63. See id. at 143-44, 164. 
164 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 16:149 
than it gives such rights to individuals.64 If it is anomalous for 
parents to control the lives of their own children, it must be 
equally anomalous for the state (including the state's judiciary) 
to control the lives of 'its' children.65 In fact there is no anomaly 
in either case: adult childrearing authority is legitimate precisely 
because it is in children's best interests to be nurtured, disci-
plined and educated by responsible adults. 
One wishes, therefore, that Dwyer would stop selectively 
denouncing parental control, and address the issue that truly 
separates parentalists from statists: which type of control-pri-
vate and parental, or public and governmental-is more likely to 
be in the children's best interests.66 The parentalist answer is 
that parental control should be presumed superior unless the 
parents' choices are clearly unreasonable. That presumption 
does not rest on the naive belief that parents unfailingly do what 
is good for their children. Rather, it reflects the comparative 
judgment that the fallible human agents through whom govern-
ment must act are less likely to do what is good for other peo-
ple's children than fallible individual parents are to do what is 
good for their own. 67 
But what is Dwyer's answer? He suggests that it is "naive to 
think that parents are always more competent to judge their 
child's best interests than are state agency personnel."68 The 
relevant question, however, is not whether parents are always 
more competent than state officials, but whether they generally 
are. Dwyer never takes a definite stand on how that question 
should be answered. He seems to believe he can bypass it by 
64. Cf. id. at 119 ("Treating children equally should mean that we deny the legiti-
macy of any purported rights residing in any person or group to direct their lives"). 
65. See Gilles, 26 Capital U. L. Rev. at 18-19 (cited in note 21). 
66. Id. at 19. Dwyer makes this very point, but fails to grasp its implications. 
Dwyer, Religious Schools at 176-77 (cited in note 8) ("In one way or another, the law 
determines the contours of a child's life, either by authorizing agents of the state to as-
sume responsibility for certain aspects of that life or by explicitly or implicitly granting 
parents control over it"). 
67. Gilles, 26 Capital U.L. Rev. at 19 (cited in note 21). See also Mary-Michelle 
Upson Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There A Right To Have 
One ·s Child Excused From Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. Cal. L. Rev. 871, 888-89 
(1977) (in the context of education, "the common law right of parental control" was 
based on "two assumptions: first, that the parent had equal or superior knowledge of the 
child's 'physical and mental capabilities and future prospects,' compared to the teacher 
or other school authorities; and second, that because of the parent's 'natural affections,' 
the parent was more likely to act for the best interest of the individual child than the 
teacher or other school authority who, by contrast, had a 'mere temporary interest in the 
welfare of the child.'"). 
68. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 86 (cited in note 8). 
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showing that parental rights (as contrasted with parentally-
asserted children's rights) are not necessary to protect children's 
best interests. But if parents are better guardians of children's 
best interests than the state, the parentalist presumption will en-
hance children's welfare whether the law is couched in terms of 
parent's rights or children's rights.69 
Nevertheless, Dwyer rejects the parentalist presumption in 
favor of having courts decide whose opinion-parents' or the 
state's-is "more consistent with the rights and temporal inter-
ests of the child."70 The flaw in this approach is its blithe as-
sumption that state agencies, and above all courts, will ex~ertly 
and disinterestedly pursue the best interests of children. 1 A 
moment's reflection will show that courts are neither as well-
placed as parents to discern the child's best interests nor as in-
terested in ensuring that the child's welfare is in fact advanced. 
Unlike parents, judges will never have the time or the day-to-day 
contact necessary to acquire an intimate understanding of the 
procession of children who would come before them. Nor will 
they have to live with the many-faceted ramifications of their 
childrearing decisions. 
Dwyer thinks these problems can be solved by urging 
judges, when determining children's best interests, to take ap-
propriate account of parents' love for and special knowledge of 
their children.72 But courts are far too likely to substitute their 
judgment for that of parents without troubling to understand the 
parents' values, the child's character, and the family's situation. 
Dwyer finds it naive to give presumptive weight to parents' 
judgments when they conflict with the views of "state agency 
personnel who spend their lives studying and thinking about 
what is best for children."73 I find it naive to describe the run of 
state employees in such idealistic terms, let alone to believe that 
they will more often be better judges of a child's best interests 
than that child's parents. State agency personnel may spend 
years thinking about what is best for children-but parents 
spend decades doing what they think is best for their own chil-
69. I d. at 81. 
70. I d. at 86. 
71. Dwyer's adoption of this assumption is especially odd in light of his refrain that 
courts unjustifiably pay more attention to the interests of adults than they do to the in-
terests of children. It never seems to occur to him that this might be because courts and 
agencies have wea~ incentives to champion children's interests, rather than because legal 
doctnne proceeds m terms of parental nghts rather than children's rights. 
72. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 86 (cited in note 8). 
73. ld. 
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dren, and living with the consequences. Parents are far more 
likely to get it right, even if they have fewer course-credits in 
child development or education theory.74 Yet courts engaged in 
de novo review are more likely to credit the views of state agen-
cies, both because the agencies are repeat players and because 
(in the case of state courts) they are part of the same govern-
ment.75 
There is every reason to think, therefore, that Dwyer's plan 
for de novo judicial review of parental childrearing decisions will 
harm far more children than it helps. Indeed, Dwyer himself re-
treats from its full implications: he suggests that there are some 
categories of cases in which it is "beyond the competence of the 
courts" to decide the child's best interests,76 and proposes that in 
these contexts courts should create presumptions based on 
"which party is, in general, in the better position to make the 
kind of decision at issue . . . in a manner consistent with the 
child's temporal interests. "77 Subject to one important qualifica-
tion, I agree that this is the right criterion for deciding whether 
the childrearing presumption runs in favor of parents or the 
state.78 But why confine its use to cases that are "beyond the 
competence of the courts"?79 If our paramount concern is chil-
74. Indeed, some would say that coursework in these fields makes people less able 
to discern the best interests of children. This suggestion may have considerable merit, in 
light of the many trendy but unsuccessful educational initiatives schools of education 
have promoted in recent decades, ranging from New Math to whole-language reading to 
the self-esteem movement. 
75. Under Dwyer"s approach, federal courts would play a major role in determining 
children's best interests, because many childrearing issues would involve children's con-
stitutional rights. But state courts would be heavily involved as well, both because their 
jurisdiction encompasses federal constitutional claims, and because many child-welfare 
issues would continue to arise under state statutory and common law. De novo review by 
state courts is even more problematic than I suggest in the text, because their interests 
tend to be aligned with the agencies and officials who speak for the state in parent-state 
conflicts-and whose agendas often have little to do with pursuing the best interests of 
children. Beyond that, because most state-court judges are elected, their decisions will 
tend to reflect the preferences and prejudices of those who have the most influence on 
judicial elections: lawyers, local politicians, and the media. There is no reason to suppose 
these groups are a reliable barometer of the best interests of individual children. 
76. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 86 (cited in note 8). 
77. Id. Dwyer also concedes that "in many aspects of children's lives this approach 
would support a presumption of parental decision-making authority." Id. at 87. This 
concession does not inspire much confidence, however, because in the only examples he 
mentions (teacher certification and "sexist education") he says the presumption should 
favor the state. I d. at 87. 
78. The qualification is that I disagree with Dwyer's exclusive focus on the child's 
temporal interests, and with the interpretation of the Establishment Clause on which it 
rests. I deal with these issues in Part III below. 
79. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 86 (cited in note 8). Dwyer does not explain by 
what standard he would determine the issue of judicial competence. 
1999] HEY, CHRISTIANS 167 
dren's welfare, we should apply this criterion to the courts them-
selves by asking who-the child's parents or the court-is more 
competent to determine the child's best interests. The existing 
legal rules, of course, implicitly answer that question in favor of 
individual parents: courts have jurisdiction over childrearing dis-
putes between state and parents, but the parentalist presumption 
effectively insulates specific parental decisions from de novo ju-
dicial review.80 
D. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING HARM TO CHILDREN 
At bottom, what is at stake in allocating childrearing 
authority between parents and the state is who decides what is in 
children's best interests and, on the other hand, what is harmful 
to children. These two issues can be seen as two sides of the 
same coin: any choice that is not in a child's best interests must, 
by hypothesis, be harmful to the child as compared to whatever 
choice is in the child's best interests. But in everyday life we do 
not normally equate harm to children with "everything other 
than what is best for children." Rather, in light of the difficulties 
of reaching consensus on what is best for children, most people 
reserve the word "harmful" for choices that seem drastically in-
ferior to what they perceive to be the best choice (or choices- in 
cases where no one choice seems to them clearly best). We do 
something similar in the law of childrearing: as a very rough ap-
proximation, state family law and federal constitutional law let 
parents decide where their children's best interests lie, subject to 
the state's power to override parental choices that are harmful in 
some strong sense-that are 'destructive' or 'abusive' and there-
fore warrant legal intervention, not just raised eyebrows. 
The crucial question for constitutional law, however, is to 
decide what are the limits on the state's power to classify chil-
drearing practices as legally harmful to children. This question is 
functionally equivalent to asking what level of scrutiny courts 
should apply to childrearing laws, for that determines how 
strong the state's justification for interfering with constitution-
80. Although I have framed them in terms of state and federal courts, the foregoing 
arguments also apply, mutatis mutandis, to proposals to transfer primary authority over 
childrearing to state legislatures, education officials, or child-welfare agencies. For ex-
ample, a statutory childrearing code that tried to define children's best interests would 
reduce judicial discretion, but create new problems of its own. Such legislation would 
inevitably be heavily influenced by affected interest groups; legislators have no special 
ms1ght mto or concern for children's welfare; and the generality of legislation would nec-
essanly result in errors in many individual cases. 
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ally protected conduct must be. If childrearing laws need have 
only a rational basis, states have enormous latitude to decide 
what practices are harmful to children. Indeed, a state could 
presumably decide that any childrearing behavior that deviates 
from the state's conception of children's best interests is harmful 
to children, and should be prohibited. Provided the state's view 
of children's best interests were itself rational (that is, not pat-
ently unreasonable), the prohibition could be enforced against 
parents on the ground that deviating from what the state has de-
cided is best for children necessarily reduces the child's overall 
welfare. If, on the other hand, some form of heightened scrutiny 
applies, states could not simply rely on their unsupported judg-
ments about what is in children's best interests. They would be 
required to satisfy the reviewing court that overriding the par-
ents' decision is necessary to avoid harm to the child-and what 
counts as "harm" for these purposes would ultimately be a ques-
tion of federal constitutional law. 
The parentalist answer to these questions is that heightened 
scrutiny should apply, and the constitutional test of what is 
harmful to children should be whether the evidence of overall 
harm is so strong as to preclude reasonable disagreement. Rea-
sonable people disagree both about the nature of the good life 
and about how to prepare children to lead it.81 Consequently, al-
though there is consensus that certain practices are harmful to 
children, it is much more common to find that a practice is con-
troversial but reasonable: many parents think it harmful, many 
others think it beneficial, and there are reasoned arguments on 
each side. Because individual parents, not states or political 
majorities, are ordinarily the best guardians of children's best in-
terests, the state is more likely to do harm than good to children 
when it overrides the reasonable choices their parents make on 
their behalf. If parents starve or brutalize their child, or prevent 
the child from acquiring foundational skills such as reading, 
writing, and calculating, there is consensus that the¥z are doing 
harm, and state intervention is entirely appropriate. But rea-
81. This is "the fact of reasonable pluralism," that is, the fact that persons in our 
society adhere to "reasonable though incompatible ... doctrines" about ultimate ends 
and values. Rawls, Political Liberalism at xvii-xviii (cited in note 14). 
82. Given undeniable harm to the child, the debate is not about the propriety of 
state intervention, but about whether to interpret the Constitution affirmatively to re-
quire it. On that issue, although DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dept. of Social Services, 
489 U.S. 189 (1989), is to the contrary, many constitutional theorists would endorse a 
constitutional norm requiring the state to protect children from what it knows (or pre-
dicts) to be serious impending violence at the hands of their parents. 
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sonable disagreements between parents and the government 
about what is harmful to children-or best for them-belong in 
the realm of persuasion, not state coercion.83 
Dwyer rejects the parentalist approach because it enables 
parents who reject his views on childrearing to educate their 
children in ways he deems contrary to their best interests. He 
argues that "[c]hild-rearing conduct should be viewed the same 
as other conduct affecting nonconsenting persons-as subject to 
legal restriction when it causes what the state regards as harm,"84 
and he thinks any practice that deviates from the child's best in-
terest should count as harmful. Indeed, that is the premise from 
which he deduces that courts should decide parent-state chil-
drearing conflicts in accord with their view of the child's best in-
terests. 
Standing alone, these views might suggest that he favors a 
majoritarian childrearing regime in which state legislatures, 
courts and agencies would decide what constituted children's 
temporal best interests, and in which parents would have no con-
stitutional rights to act differently. In fact, although gaps in his 
presentation make it impossible to be sure, Dwyer's position 
seems at bottom highly countermajoritarian. Although he wants 
to abolish parental rights as such, he also indicates that children 
should have rights to be free from harmful state interference 
with their parents' childrearing decisions.85 Because the rights he 
is concerned to abolish are principally the federal constitutional 
rights of parents, it seems clear that the children's rights he pro-
poses to replace them with would likewise enjoy federal consti-
tutional standing. In order to enforce these rights, courts would 
need independently to determine, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, who is correct about the child's best interest-the 
state, in which event the child would have no complaint, or the 
child's parents, in which case state intervention would be uncon-
stitutional. 
lB. The philosophy underlying our childrearing norms is broadly pluralist: whatever 
may be the best way to raise a child, there are many good ways, any of which can develop 
the child's basic capacities and equip the child for some reasonable conception of the 
good life. The presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children is of a 
piece with this pluralism; for if that presumption is correct, then the fact that conscien-
tious parents raise their children in many different ways implies that different children 
have different best interests. 
84. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 94 (cited in note 8). 
85. Id. at 64 ("children would possess a right against any state interference with 
their parents' child-rearing practices or choices that would not, on the whole, improve 
the children's well-being, and parents would be authorized to act as agents for their chil-
dren and assert the children's rights against any inappropriate state action"). 
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Furthermore, as I discuss in Part II, Dwyer uses Rawlsian 
techniques to develop a comprehensive theory of children's 
temporal best interests that furnishes his standard for evaluating 
traditionalist religious education. Although he never spells out 
the precise connection between this theory (which he describes 
as a theory of "children's positive rights") and the federal Con-
stitution,86 presumably state laws defining children's best inter-
ests in ways consistent with his theory would be deemed benefi-
cial to children for purposes of constitutional analysis. On the 
other hand, a state childrearing law that clashes with his theory 
presumably infringes children's constitutional rights by prevent-
ing parents from acting in children's best interests. Thus, 
Dwyer's theory of children's temporal best interests seems to 
serve as a binding constitutional norm that, at a minimum, de-
termines which state childrearing laws are permitted and which 
are not. It is even possible, though Dwyer does not quite say so 
that states would be constitutionally required to enact childrear-
ing laws designed to implement his theory of children's positive 
. h 87 ng ts. 
If correct, this analysis of Dwyer's approach sheds a differ-
ent light on what separates it from liberal parentalism (and, to a 
lesser extent, parents' constitutional rights under current law). 
Dwyer would give the government sweeping power to enforce a 
particular conception of children's best interests. But that con-
ception would be neither majoritarian, nor variable from state to 
state. It would be a federal constitutional conception of chil-
dren's best interests, based on the theory of children's positive 
rights Dwyer constructs. Whatever its precise home in the Con-
86. Surprisingly, Dwyer nowhere explains whether his argument is that children 
actually do have the positive rights his theory recognizes, or merely that they should. He 
tells us that his conclusions about children's substantive rights "suggest that states not 
only must extend current regulations governing public schools ... to cover religious 
schools ... [but] must also fashion new regulations to deal with harmful practices that 
exist .. only in religious schools." Id. at 179. But he stops short of explicitly claiming that 
the positive rights his theory would give children are binding constitutional norms, not 
just moral obligations or theoretical policy prescriptions. 
87. In light of Dwyer's willingness to advance a radical new interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause (pursuant to which states would generally be forbidden to ex-
empt religious schools from state educational regulation), his failure to address whether 
equal protection also requires states to conform to his conception of children's temporal 
best interests seems especially odd. The argument I would have expected him to make is 
that a state's failure to secure basic liberties for children to the same degree as for adults, 
or to secure basic opportunities for children from traditionalist religious families to the 
same degree as for children of other parentage, states a cognizable claim under the fun-
damental-rights branch of equal protection analysis, and as such merits heightened scru-
tiny. 
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stitution, and whatever the precise extent to which it is binding 
on the states, the fundamental question is whether Dwyer's the-
ory is a persuasive explication of the just principles of a constitu-
tional order for childrearing. In Part II, I will answer that ques-
tion in two stages. First, I will argue that Dwyer's theory fails 
even if we accept its initial assumptions-including his especially 
controversial claim that all childrearing decisions must be based 
solely on children's temporal interests. Second, I will argue that 
Dwyer fails to make the case for the proposition on which many 
of his judgments and conclusions depend: that conservative re-
ligious education is bad for children when judged by secular 
standards. 
II. IS TRADITIONALIST RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH CHILDREN'S TEMPORAL BEST 
INTERESTS? 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF DWYER'S CONCEPTION OF CHILDREN'S 
TEMPORAL BEST INTERESTS 
The second stage of Dwyer's project is to develop a concep-
tion of children's temporal best interests that can be enforced 
through law. He proceeds by employing the Rawlsian device of 
the Original Position: behind a veil of ignorance as to our cir-
cumstances and endowments, we must imagine living as a child, 
becoming an adult, and becoming a parent under various possi-
ble childrearing regimes.88 In using this decisionmaking device, 
however, we must also assume that we remain committed to cer-
tain basic moral principles: for Dwyer, the relevant principles are 
that no person is entitled to control the life of another person, 
and that (as required by the Establishment Clause) the state may 
act only on the basis of widely held secular values and beliefs 
about the temporal consequences of various childrearing re-
• 89 gtmes. 
Dwyer argues that two fundamental principles emerge from 
this reflective inquiry: equal liberty and equal opportunity. The 
principle of equal liberty requires that children (to the extent 
their developing abilities permit) enjoy an equal share of basic 
liberties, including freedom of the person, freedom of thought 
88. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 148-52 (cited in note 8). 
89. ld. at 151. Dwyer offers no argument for this assumption apart from his inter-
pretation of the Establishment Clause. 
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and expression, freedom of religion, and basic political rights.90 
The principle of equal opportunity requires that all educational, 
social, and career opportunities be equally available to all chil-
dren who have the native talents and abilities needed for them.91 
As Dwyer interprets it, the equal liberty principle allows restric-
tions on the liberty of children (like that of adults) to prevent 
harm or wrong to others;92 but paternalistic restrictions on chil-
dren's liberty are legitimate "only to the extent necessary to 
promote [children's] temporal well-being on the whole and in 
the long run. "93 In turn, the equal opportunity principle requires 
that all schools ensure that children's intellectual, social, and vo-
cational capacities are equally well-developed regardless of ir-
relevant characteristics such as their race, their gender, or the 
religious beliefs of their parents.94 
Dwyer then argues that the practices of traditionalist relig-
ious schools-in particular, Christian Fundamentalist and Ro-
man Catholic schools-are pervasively inconsistent with both 
equal liberty and equal opportunity.95 For example, these 
schools violate children's personal liberty by inflicting corporal 
punishments and condemning all premarital sexual activity;96 
they violate children's freedom of thought and expression by re-
quiring them to attend religious activities;97 and they violate their 
political liberty by inculcating sexist views and intolerance for 
other ways of life.98 They also violate the principle of equal op-
portunity by depriving their students of an education at least 
roughly equal to what states aspire to provide to children in 
public schools.99 For example, rather than developing children's 
ability to think critically, they discourage it; rather than teaching 
children standard views on scientific and historical issues, they 
reject these accepted truths; and rather than fostering self-
esteem and positive attitudes toward their minds and bodies, 
they foster a negative self-image in children by denigrating them 
. f 1 100 as sm u persons. 
90. !d. at 155. 
91. !d. at 166. 
92. !d. at 154. 
93. ld. 
94. !d. at 166-67. 
95. !d. at 162. 
96. !d. at 158-59. 
97. !d. at 160-61. 
98. !d. at 162. 
99. !d. at 167. 
100. !d. at 166-74. 
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B. WHY DWYER'S THEORY FAILS EVEN GRANTING ITS 
PREMISES 
For argument's sake, let us grant Dwyer his initial assump-
tions that states may consider only children's temporal interests, 
and that no person is entitled to control the life of another. On 
those assumptions, he claims that the Original Position device 
allows him to derive his conception of children's educational 
rights while "rely[ing] ... only on substantive secular values that 
I believe are broadly accepted. "101 This assurance- which, unless 
Dwyer is engaged in Clintonesque hairsplitting, must also mean 
that the values in question are not broadly rejected-is critical to 
the entire enterprise. Without it, Dwyer could manipulate the 
outcome of his Rawlsian thought-experiment by relying on val-
ues he prefers, but as to which there is no consensus in our soci-
ety. For example, if we assume behind the veil that everyone 
prefers pleasure to health, our hypothetical social arrangements 
will call for much less state regulation of smoking, drinking, or 
'unsafe' sex than if we make the opposite assumption. In fact, 
neither assumption would be appropriate, because persons in 
our society differ widely in the relative values they place on 
pleasure and health. 
At the first stage of his argument, Dwyer keeps his promise 
to rely only on widely shared values. Behind the veil, we would 
clearly want a childrearing regime that would maximize our well-
being over our entire lifetime; liberty would be an important 
component of our well-being even during our childhood; and we 
could therefore all agree that paternalistic restrictions on chil-
dren's liberty should be based on some "substantial" children's 
interest.102 We might even reach consensus in favor of Dwyer's 
rule that paternalistic constraints are permitted "only to the ex-
tent necessary to promote [children's] temporal well-being on 
the whole and in the long run." 103 
It does not follow, however, that we could reach agreement 
concerning which restrictions on our liberty would maximize our 
overall well-being, how much weight our liberty as children 
should carry in calculating our well-being (as compared to our 
liberty as adults), or which temporal interests qualify as "sub-
stantial." Within the realm of children's temporal interests, 
there is enormous room for reasonable disagreement about what 
101. ld. at 151. 
102. Id. at 154. 
103. Id. 
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is beneficial and what is harmful to children. Dwyer refuses to 
acknowledge this stubborn fact. At the second stage of his ar-
gument, in which he applies the general rule that paternalistic 
restrictions must promote children's overall temporal well-being, 
his specific conclusions on issue after issue depend on highly 
controversial value judgments. 
Three examples will illustrate the point. First, Dwyer wants 
to ban corporal punishment on the grounds that "physically 
striking a child is not justifiable because it is not a necessary 
means to the desired end of self-discipline."104 Many committed, 
experienced parents, however, have found that corporal pun-
ishment (like persuasion, verbal correction, loss of privileges, 
and physical restraint) is an effective and appropriate technique 
for disciplining their children (and teaching them self-discipline). 
Indeed, some would argue that parents who categorically refuse 
to engage in corporal punishment, even when their children have 
engaged in egregious acts of defiance or aggression, harm their 
children by failing to convey the seriousness of their misbehav-
ior, and by misleading them about the way human beings typi-
cally react to behavior such as they are exhibiting. In any event, 
moderate corporal punishment is legal and commonplace in 
homes and schools throughout the United States. 
Second, Dwyer would forbid schools to teach adolescents 
that premarital sex is categorically wrong, on the grounds that 
this P<?licy places unnecessary restrictions on their sexual free-
dom.105 But a flat ban on premarital sex is not a denial of chil-
dren's sexual freedom: it is a denial of sexual license for the sake 
of future sexual and personal fulfillment in marriage. Or so 
thoughtful critics of sexual permissiveness reasonably argue on 
perfectly secular, pragmatic grounds.106 Few people doubt that 
the sexual permissiveness of recent generations is closely con-
nected with our society's skyrocketing rates of sexually transmit-
ted diseases, divorce, and unwed motherhood- and that these 
changes have been disastrous for children. Dwyer's insistence 
that we can protect adolescents from the immediate risks of sex-
ual activity by teaching them to engage in "intercourse with ap-
104. !d. at 158. 
105. !d. at 159. 
106. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The End of Courtship, 126 The Public Interest 39 (Win-
ter, 1997). Kass marshals a variety of arguments and evidence for the proposition that 
premarital sex has long-run harmful effects, and urges young feminists to "advanc[) the 
truest interest of women (and men and children) by raising (again) the radical banner, 
'Not until you marry me'(.]" !d. at 63. See also Sarah E. Hinlicky, Subversive Virginity, 
First Things 14 (Oct., 1998). 
1999] HEY, CHRISTIANS 175 
propriate precautions," 107 many would argue, recklessly disre-
gards the fragility of adolescent self-control and the strength of 
adolescent hormones.108 It also ignores the risk that, even if dis-
aster doesn't strike, premarital sexual activity will make it harder 
for children to find lasting happiness and commitment in mar-
riage. For all these reasons, the case for teen chastilr is a strong 
one-as an increasing number of adolescents agree.1 
Third, Dwyer contends that religious schools must be re-
quired to employ only certified teachers, on the grounds that 
trained teachers are more effective educators. 110 Yet, as the 
leading case upholding the application of a state teacher-
certification law to religious schools concedes, "there is a lack of 
empirical evidence concerning the relationship between certified 
teachers and a quality education."111 That should come as no 
surprise: the most convincing explanation for teacher-
certification laws is that they are anti-competitive measures de-
signed to restrict the supply of new teachers, with teacher quality 
serving as a convenient fig-leaf. 112 Even if, all else equal, certi-
fied teachers were marginally superior to non-certified ones, it 
would still be perfectly reasonable for parents to suppose that 
non-certified teachers who share their values will do a better job 
educating their children than certified ones who don't. 113 
107. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 159 (cited in note 8). 
108. A recent report analyzing the Longitudinal Study on Adolescent Health finds 
that "perceived parent disapproval" of adolescent sexual activity is a stronger deterrent 
to teen pregnancy than "effective contraceptive use." Michael D. Resnick, M.D., et al, 
Protecting Adolescents From Harm: Findings From the National Longitudinal Study on 
Adolescent Health, lAMA, 823,830 tbl.8 (Sept. 10, 1997). 
109. !d. (noting that nearly 16% of females and 10% of males in the LSAH sample 
reported making pledges of virginity, and finding that a "higher level of importance as-
cribed to religion and prayer" and a "pledge to remain a virgin" are factors associated 
with a delayed sexual debut). See also Richard Nadler, Glum and Glummer, National 
Review 26, 28 (Sept. 28, 1998) reporting recent declines in the percentage of 15-19 year 
old males and females with sexual experience). 
110. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 87 (cited in note 8). Dwyer's motives on this issue 
are not confined to concern with educational effectiveness. In his conclusion, he suggests 
that teacher-certification requirements are an especially useful way for states to assert 
control over the actual practices of religious schools. !d. at 181. 
111. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485,494 (8th Cir. 1987) (rejecting 
free exercise challenge). 
112. On this hypothesis, the fact that every state requires public school teachers to 
be certified, while most states exempt teachers at private and religious schools, is not (as 
Dwyer would have it) further proof that states cavalierly sacrifice the interests of chil-
dren in religious schools. Rather, these laws, and the exemptions to them, simply reflect 
the power of teachers' unions in the public sector, and their weakness in the private (and 
especially the religious) sector. 
113. Certified teachers are also more expensive than non-certified ones. Budgetary 
constderatwns are plamly a legitimate consideration for religious families forced to pay 
state and local taxes to subsidize public schools to which they cannot in good conscience 
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These examples (and many others like them) belie Dwyer's 
promise that his theory will rely only on "broadly accepted" and 
"more-or-less uncontested" secular values.114 The appeal of 
Rawlsian Original Position analysis, however, lies precisely in its 
promise that only consensus-backed judgments will determine 
the fundamental law and bring coercive state power to bear on 
individuals. The failure of Dwyer's Original Position analysis in 
this respect is therefore fatal to his theory of children's rights. 
Anyone who takes seriously the Rawlsian concern for toleration 
and neutrality in the legal treatment of competing reasonable 
conceptions of the good must acknowledge that Dwyer's contro-
versial secular value judgments should not be forced on parents 
who reasonably disagree with them. 
Dwyer knows he has a problem here, and he tries to solve it 
by taking the offensive. He sharply criticizes Rawls and other 
liberal theorists, insisting that "the value of toleration is simply 
irrelevant, in the context of children's education," because chil-
drearing is "essentially other-determining" rather than a matter 
of self-determination.115 This criticism misunderstands the 
grounds on which Rawlsian theory endorses toleration. The 
Rawlsian claim is that those who control the coercive power of 
the state (whether an ordinary political majority or the framers 
and interpreters of a constitution) cannot legitimately impose 
their conception of the good life on those who subscribe to other 
views (a political minority or future generations of citizens). The 
argument on which it rests is that the rulers have no need to 
write their conception of the good into law, because they will 
enjoy the freedom to live as they think best even if they refrain 
from legislating. Should the rulers nonetheless do so, they un-
justly deprive other persons of a basic freedom while preserving 
that very freedom for themselves. 
In the case of childrearing, the argument is precisely the 
same, except that the freedom in question is other-determining 
rather than self-determining. Children's upbringing will be de-
termined by adults whether childrearing authority belongs to the 
government or to individual parents. Thus, the question is not 
whether our childrearing regime will entail other-determining 
governance of children by adults; it is which adults will enjoy the 
freedom to engage in this other-determining behavior. Under 
send their children. 
114. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 151 (cited in note 8). 
115. !d. at 152. 
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Dwyer's approach, the adults who are empowered ultimately to 
decide what is in children's best interests (whether the majority 
or the courts) wield other-determining authority over all chil-
dren-including their own-while dissenters are denied other-
determining authority over any children-even their own. This 
is a blatant violation of equal liberty. 
Dwyer is therefore wrong in thinking that the other-
determining character of childrearing makes toleration irrele-
vant. What would make toleration irrelevant-at least by Rawl-
sian standards- would be a successful resort to the Original Po-
sition device. Because the conclusions arrived at in the Original 
Position are reached by hypothetical consensus, there is no injus-
tice in equally obliging every parent to comply with them-even 
if the consequence is that some parents' actual preferences are 
frustrated while others' are reinforced. Therefore, if Dwyer 
could establish an Original Position consensus in favor of his 
conception of children's positive rights, he could justify state co-
ercion of parents who disagree. Dwyer's attack on Rawlsian tol-
eration and pluralism thus stands or falls with his Original Posi-
tion analysis. As I have already shown, however, that analysis 
breaks down because there is no consensus on which practices 
will maximize children's well-being over the course of their life-
times. The norms Dwyer announces rest on controversial values 
that cannot legitimately be imposed on other persons by force of 
law, and thus his project fails on its own Rawlsian terms. 
Indeed, the general standard Dwyer derives from the Origi-
nal Position-the child's overall temporal well-being-is quite 
consistent with the parentalist presumption. To say that this 
standard should govern childrearing decisions leaves open the 
question who should be entrusted with the responsibility for ap-
plying that standard. Dwyer simply assumes that this crucial 
question of authority-allocation has been settled in favor of the 
state. But that question should itself be part of the Original Po-
sition inquiry. Whom would we want to have the authority to 
decide what specific restrictions on our freedom are necessary to 
advance the best interests of the children we turn out to be? 
Dwyer is certainly right that "parties behind the veil of igno-
rance would not limit legal protection of their liberties to rights 
against the state, as the Constitution does, but would also wish to 
guard against incursions on their freedom by private parties, as 
statutes and common-law rules do ... "116 This generalization, 
116. Id. at 153. 
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however, does not tell us which protections '.1Ve would want 
against our own parents, and which protections we would want 
against the state. Behind the veil, we should assume that state 
oversight of parents will be costly in child-welfare terms: it will 
diminish children's freedom from the state, and subject them to 
the risk of errors by the state. Because parents are on average 
the best guardians of their children's temporal best interests, our 
overall well-being-both as children and parents-will be better 
served if our childrearing regime authorizes parents, rather than 
the state, to determine what restrictions on children's liberty are 
necessary to promote their long-run temporal well-being. 
C. DWYER FAILS TO SHOW THAT TRADITIONALIST RELIGION 
IS HARMFUL TO CHILDREN'S TEMPORAL INTERESTS 
Dwyer's claim that childrearing decisions must be based 
solely on children's temporal interests is bad political theory, not 
just bad constitutional law (as I'll argue in Part III). Dwyer says 
he is justified in importing his secularist interpretation of the 
Religion Clauses into the Original Position because it is "a 
model of state decision making, and one of the higher-order 
fixed points in our liberal democratic culture is that the state 
should not decide theological issues .... "117 But the purpose of 
the Original Position inquiry he undertakes is to decide what 
childrearing regime is best for children (and the adults they will 
become). If it would be better for children to make an exception 
to this alleged "fixed Roint," the logic of Dwyer's own argument 
requires him to do so. 18 
Although Dwyer never squarely confronts this question, 
there is little doubt that he would answer it by asserting that tra-
ditionalist religion is irrational, repressive, and bad for both chil-
dren and adults. 119 He charges that traditionalist religious com-
117. ld. at 151. Notice that Dwyer makes no mention of that other "fixed point"-
freedom of speech-instead endorsing pervasive content-based regulation of religious 
speech to children by schools and parents. As I discuss in Part IV, these proposals run 
counter to settled free speech principles. 
118. A similar inconsistency surfaces when Dwyer notes that some religious groups 
(such as Christian Scientists) believe prayer is more efficacious in restoring health than 
modern medicine, and proceeds to deny that this is "an argument that the state can ac-
cept as true or even reasonable." !d. at 60. But why not, if the temporal well-being of 
children is the benchmark? The question should be what evidence the Christian Scien-
tists can produce in support of their belief, and how it stacks up against the evidence in 
favor of medical intervention. 
119. Although Dwyer's focus is on Roman Catholic and Christian Fundamentalist 
schools, he makes clear his expectation that similar conclusions would apply to Orthodox 
Jewish and Islamic schools as well. See id. at 130 (describing the "sexist socialization" 
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munities seek to "repress the minds of children so that they are 
incapable of rejecting the community's beliefs or pursuing a life 
outside the community as adults,"120 and make "children's sense 
of security and self-worth depend on being 'saved' or meeting 
unreasonable, divinely ordained standards of conduct,"121 Obvi-
ously, these charges also pertain to the adult members of tradi-
tionalist religious communities-for they too are threatened with 
damnation, required to comply with "unreasonable" religious 
commands, and pressured to reject the secular culture in favor of 
life within the community. Dwyer concedes that the Free Exer-
cise Clause entitles adults to adhere to traditionalist religions, 
however irrational they may be. 122 But he thinks it legitimate, 
indeed imperative, for the state to try to prevent religious tradi-
tionalists from passing their beliefs on to their children, by guar-
anteeing those children "an education that counteracts this ef-
fort, that makes it possible for [them] to choose and live 
successfully within other ways of life and systems of belief."123 
Thus, referring to children growing up in fundamentalist Chris-
tian families, he writes: "Knowing that these children will incur 
the scorn of mainstream America if they grow up to be like their 
families, why do we not act to prevent that, for their sake, rather 
than expect mainstream Americans to develop a respect for 
people who argue dogmatically for reactionary policies based 
upon religious premises we do not share?"124 
These charges-some of which amount to outright big-
otry-are unpersuasive even in wholly secular terms. Dwyer 
badly underestimates the worldly resources and rewards of re-
ligious traditionalism. He assumes that there is no good secular 
rationale for the vast majority of religiously-commanded chil-
drearing practices, and that once we limit our focus to children's 
secular interests a consensus in favor of his progressive, ration-
alist approach to childrearing practices will rapidly and inevita-
bly emerge. (As if the only conviction separating religious con-
Orthodox Jewish girls receive), id. at 180 (recognizing and endorsing the possibility that 
the extensive regulation of religious schools he proposes "would so radically alter their 
nature as to make them unrecognizable as Fundamentalist or Catholic (or Jewish or 
Muslim) institutions"). His explanation for not evaluating the practices of Orthodox 
Jewish and Muslim schools is that "there is so little published information about their 
practices that it is not possible for outsiders to form much of an impression of what goes 
on inside them." Id. at 13. 
120. !d. at 168. 
121. Id. at 179. 
122. ld. at 83. 
123. !d. at 168. 
124. ld. at 173. 
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servatives from secular progressives were belief in heaven and 
hell!) In fact, there are well-known and widely-held temporal 
justifications for many of the religious commands Dwyer attacks. 
For example, the whole matrix of traditional Christian restric-
tions on sexual activity can be seen as protecting the marital 
family as an institution in which men, women, and children can 
flourish in this world, while seeking salvation in the next. 125 
Dwyer asserts that even if these sexual restrictions would 
benefit children, it isn't necessary to implement them "by threat 
of divine retribution rather than by respectful discussion of the 
practical consequences. "126 Yet there is a perfectly respectable 
secular argument that fear of otherworldly consequences is nec-
essary to persuade many people to respect the rights of others 
and even to pursue their own long-run self-interest. On this 
view, it is a short step from Nietzche's triumphant declaration 
that "God is dead"127 to the nihilistic view that "If God is dead, 
then everything is permitted. "128 Dwyer blithely assumes that a 
robust secular morality will take the place of the traditionalist 
religious faith he is so eager to subvert. No doubt some children 
can be instilled with both good moral values and atheism or ag-
nosticism. It is far from clear, however, that such an education 
would be feasible for all (or even most) children.129 The default 
way of life in our mass culture is not moral philosophy (Kantian, 
Millian, Rawlsian, or whatever) as preached by secular intellec-
tuals-it is materialistic hedonism as practiced by ordinary peo-
ple. Many thoughtful observers, of all persuasions, see such lives 
as selfish, slavish, and superficial. If Dwyer thinks Hollywood is 
a better guide to human fulfillment than the Bible, he should ex-
plain why. If he thinks a robust secular morality can take root in 
the society at large (rather than just among the intelligentsia), he 
125. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 243-44 (Harvard U. Press, 1992). 
("The history of public policy toward sex since the beginning of the Christian era is one 
of efforts to confine sexual activity to marriage," thereby promoting "a substantive con-
ception of the marital relationship-that of companionate marriage-which (the Church] 
has bequeathed to modem people in the West regardless of their religious beliefs"). This 
acknowledgement of the secular importance of Christian sexual morality carries particu-
lar weight, coming as it does from a scholar who tends to be strongly libertarian in mat-
ters of adult sexual behavior. 
126. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 159 (cited in note 8). 
127. Walter Kaufmann, ed., The Portable Nietzche 124 (Viking Press, 1954). 
128. Patrick Glynn, God: The Evidence: The Reconciliation of Faith and Reason in a 
Postsecular World 13 (Forum, 1997). 
129. See George Washington, Farewell Address, September 17, 1796 ("Whatever 
may be conceded to the influence of fine education on minds of peculiar stature, reason 
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of 
religious principle"). 
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should explain how.130 Until then, anyone who thinks moral val-
ues are among children's most important temporal interests will 
find his attack on traditionalist Christianity unconvincing. 
Dwyer also insists that religious ways of life be temporally 
justifiable on each and every issue in isolation. But what is the 
justification for this demand? Any tradition worth the name, be 
it religious or secular, offers a comprehensive way of life-an or-
ganic whole, not a menu from which one picks and chooses some 
eclectic mix of optimal solutions. For this very reason, every 
tradition- including the tradition of Enlightenment rationalism 
in which Dwyer's liberal egalitarianism places him-has its awk-
wardnesses and problems.131 It doesn't follow, however, that 
persons who adhere to a tradition are acting contrary to their 
overall best interests, temporal or otherwise. The more likely 
secular explanation is that most people who situate themselves 
within a tradition, and seek to raise their children in accord with 
it, do so because in their experience that tradition's benefits 
plainly outweigh whatever burdens and constraints it imposes. 
Unsurprisingly, Dwyer is not interested in the testimony of 
the millions of Americans who would endorse this explanation-
who would say that traditionalist religion 'works' for them. He 
focuses exclusively on hostile sources: "studies" of traditionalist 
religious schools by highly unsympathetic academics, a survey of 
women who have left the Catholicism in which they were raised, 
and a study of textbooks in religious schools by two prominent 
strict separationists. These "ethnographic studies and personal 
testimonies," he assures us, "provide a holistic and textured view 
of the development and well-being of children in these 
schools."132 Quite the contrary, the authors on which Dwyer re-
lies seem interested in condemning and discrediting traditionalist 
religion, not describing it in a careful and balanced way. For ex-
ample, Joanna Meehl characterizes the difficulties her sample of 
ex-Catholic women experienced in leaving Catholicism as the 
problem of "Catholic shrapnel-the damage of thinking of your-
self as 'bad' goes deep, causes grave injury, and takes a lifetime 
to work itself out, if ever."133 Well, what would you expect a 
130. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, Ill Harv. 
1637 (1998) (arguing that modem normative moral philosophy lacks the intellectual co-
gency or emotional power to change people's beliefs or behavior). 
131. See generally Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (U. of 
Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
132. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 14 (cited in note 8). 
133. Id. at 38. 
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group of women who rejected Catholicism to say? One could 
just as easily do a "study" of ex-atheists and reach parallel con-
clusions about the lasting damage secularism caused them. 
Completely absent, of course, is evidence that children raised as 
Catholics are more likely to be unhappy in adulthood about their 
upbringing than children raised as secularists. Or consider Peter 
McLaren's claims-which Dwyer takes at face value-that stu-
dents at the Catholic middle school he studied "'wore' the 
hegemonic culture of the school in their very beings: in their 
wrinkled brows, in their tense musculature, in the impulsive way 
they reacted to their peers, and in the stoic way they responded 
to punishment," and that there was "a distinct eros-denying 
quality about school life, as if students were discarnate beings, 
unsullied by the taint of living flesh." 134 This is social science? 
Someone should explain to McLaren that the "living flesh" of 
teenagers is responsible for a distressingly large fraction of this 
country's populations of "at-risk" children, single mothers, and 
victims of sexually transmitted diseases. 
Nor does Dwyer discuss the impressive social scientific evi-
dence that Catholic schools are more successful than public 
schools at both academic and civic education. He completely ig-
nores two well-known comparative studies (based on the High 
Schools and Beyond data set) in which the eminent sociologist 
James S. Coleman and his co-authors found that Catholic 
schools produce better cognitive outcomes and provide a safer 
learning environment than public schools.135 And while Dwyer 
does mention the large-scale 1993 comparative study of Catholic 
and public schools by Bryk, Lee, and Holland-a study con-
firming Coleman's conclusions, while also finding that Catholic 
schools develop in children both a stronger sense of both com-
munity and self136 -he dismisses it out of hand on the absurd 
ground that "it aimed only to discover their virtues."137 
Dwyer's partisan attempt to document "evidence of 
harm"138 to children in religious schools is matched by the 
equally partisan standard by which he proposes to judge relig-
134. ld. at 23. 
135. James S. Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore, High School Achieve-
ment: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared (BasicBooks, 1982); James S. 
Coleman and Thomas Hoffer, Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Commu-
nities (BasicBooks, 1987). 
136. Anthony S. Bryk, Valerie E. Lee, and Peter B. Holland, Catholic Schools and 
the Common Good (Harvard U. Press, 1993). 
137. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 14 (cited in note 8). 
138. ld. at 20. 
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ious codes of behavior: whether "they are likely to repress, to a 
degree greater than any mainstream child development expert 
would regard as healthy, significant aspects of [children's] physi-
cal and social natures." 139 To privilege child development ex-
perts in this way is obviously to side with their social scientific 
understanding of human beings, and against the traditional 
Judeo-Christian understanding of sinful human nature. Perhaps 
(though I think it far from clear) that is a fair implication of 
Dwyer's postulate that only children's temporal well-being may 
be considered. Even if so, before conferring this enormous 
authority on the discipline of child development we need reliable 
grounds for thinking that its pretensions to expertise are well-
founded. After all, even among psychologists and child devel-
opmentalists there is considerable skepticism about how much 
this body of research and scholarship adds to our understanding 
of human beings,140 and scientists from other fields have chal-
lenged the underpinnings of much child development theory. 141 
Dwyer takes it on faith that child development experts know 
what is beneficial and harmful to children, when what is needed 
is a careful (and skeptical) analysis of the evidence for that 
proposition. 
Dwyer's unwillingness to take a hard look at our secular cul-
ture is, if anything, even more evident in his treatment of public 
schools. Although he offers a lengthy critique of religious 
schools, Dwyer declines to undertake "an evaluative comparison 
with public schools. "142 This is an indefensible omission. His 
proposals would transform religious schools from largely un-
regulated institutions into heavily regulated, quasi-public enti-
ties. Given the violence, moral malaise, and low academic 
achievement levels that afflict many public schools, it is incum-
139. Id. at 22. 
140. See, e.g., Judith Rich Harris, The Nunure Assumption: Why Children Turn Out 
the Way They Do (Free Press, 1998) (challenging much of the received wisdom (and 
much of the research methodology) of child development experts); Jerome Kagan, Three 
Seductive Ideas (Harvard U. Press, 1998) (arguing that many widely held ideas in child 
development can neither be proved nor disproved-that is, are not falsifiable). As Ann 
Hulbert notes in her review of both these books, Harris and Kagan are not alone in their 
skepticism; "plenty of scientists" have been led "to caution that 'child development is a 
product of social needs that had little to do with science qua science.'" Ann Hulbert, The 
Influence of Anxiety, The New Republic 28, 31 (Dec. 7, 1998). 
141. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, The Nature of Man, 7 
The Bank America J. Applied Corp. Finance 4-19 (1994) (arguing for an economic un-
derstanding of human nature and against the view, originally associated with Maslow and 
nowadays widely accepted by child psychologists, that there is a hierarchy of human 
needs). 
142. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 15 (cited in note 8). 
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bent on him to show why reinventing religious schools in the im-
age of public ones would make children from religious families 
better off. Rather than undertake that daunting task, he resorts 
to a double standard, describing the practices of traditionalist 
religious schools as seen by their secular academic critics, while 
describing the ideals and aspirations of public schools as they see 
themselves. 143 Consider his thumbnail description of public 
schooling as "an education that fosters higher-order thinking 
skills, promotes self-esteem, and provides the knowledge that 
most other children in society are acquiring." 144 This conception 
of a good education may be popular in progressive educational 
circles, but it is subject to serious secular objections. Children 
indoctrinated in the progressive manner often grow up without 
any significant exposure to the great religious traditions that bil-
lions of human beings have lived and died by.145 Moreover, crit-
ics of progressive education argue that its pupils are flattered at 
every turn in the name of self-esteem; are deprived of their inno-
cence in the name of sophistication and relevance; and are 
taught to "clarify" their values while being shielded from anj' but 
the most superficial views about what values are good. 1 In 
short, they are taught-or at any rate, they learn-to be con-
formists, hedonists, even nihilists. 
Many of these children also have spiritual yearnings that are 
frustrated and stunted by their educations. As the proliferation 
of New Age and other eclectic spiritual fashions attests, those 
who turn away from the shallow secularism of the public schools 
often have trouble finding what they seek. And if they do find a 
religious faith, they may have to struggle hard to keep it, because 
their progressive education has left them without good habits, 
self-discipline, and humility. Their difficulties and frustrations 
may be at least as great as those experienced by children who 
reject the traditionalist religious faith their parents have tried to 
impart to them through religious schooling. 
143. In passing, Dwyer announces late in his book that "[u)ndoubtedly many public 
schools also violate one or more of their students' liberties, and they should be taken to 
task for it." Id. at 162. Taken to task by whom? The state, which creates, operates, and 
maintains them? 
144. !d. at 146. 
145. See Warren A. Nord, Religion and American Education: Rethinking A National 
Dilemma (North Carolina, 1995). 
146. See, e.g., Charles Sykes, Dumbing Down Our Kids: Why America's Children 
Feel Good About Themselves But Can't Read, Write, or Add (St. Martin's Press, 1995); 
William Kilpatrick, Why Johnny Can't Tell Right From Wrong: Moralllliteracy and the 
Case for Character Education (Simon & Schuster, 1992). 
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In presenting these criticisms of progressive education, I am 
of course not claiming that traditionalist religious education is 
demonstrably superior to progressive education. Rather, my 
claim is that the secular objections to progressive education are 
no less plausible and powerful than the secular objections to tra-
ditionalist education. While traditionalist religious education 
deprives children of the arguable benefits of progressive ideol-
ogy, by the same token progressive education deprives them of 
the arguable benefits of religious tradition. 147 If one deprivation 
counts as a harm, so should the other. For surely neither side in 
the ongoing debate between traditionalists and progressives can 
be assumed to have a monopoly on reason, truth, or wisdom. 
Precisely for this reason, the far better view is that neither of 
these quintessentially debatable types of "harm" should suffice 
to overcome the presumption that parents are acting in their 
child's best interest when they choose an education-religious or 
secular, traditionalist or progressive-on their behalf. 
III. DOES THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FORBID 
STATES TO AUTHORIZE PARENTS (OR CHILDREN) TO 
CHOOSE TRADITIONALIST RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF DWYER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES 
Dwyer's third major thesis is that the Establishment Clause 
forbids states to give parents (or children) the authority to 
choose traditionalist religious education that is contrary to chil-
dren's temporal best interests. In his view, under the "principle 
of state neutrality on religious questions that [the Establishment 
Clause] embodies, temporal interests are the only interests with 
which the state can properly concern itself in carrying out its re-
sponsibility to protect the well-being of children and other in-
competent persons. For the state to take account of children's 
supposed spiritual interests would require it to assume the truth 
of particular religious beliefs-that children have spiritual inter-
ests in the first place, that those interests are of a certain nature, 
and that living in a certain way best serves those interests-and 
therefore to endorse a particular religious view, which the Con-
147. The character of confessional religious education is clearly explained, and its 
legitimacy and importance ably defended, in Elmer John Theissen, Teaching for Com-
mitment: Liberal Education, Indoctrination, and Christian Nurture (MeGill-Queen's U. 
Press, 1993). 
186 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.16:149 
stitution prohibits it from doing."148 Thus, when a court adjudi-
cates a childrearing dispute between parents and the state, in de-
termining whose view represents the child's best interests the 
court must focus exclusively on the child's temporal interests, 
and disregard any reasons the parents offer concerning other-
worldly matters such as salvation, damnation, and the like. 
Dwyer thinks parents' free exercise rights (rightly under-
stood) are not inconsistent with this analysis. Although the Re-
ligion Clauses leave individuals "more or less free to determine 
for themselves what they believe about religion and the role re-
ligious considerations should have in their lives-including 
whether they will sacrifice their temporal interests in some cases 
to further what they regard as their spiritual interests,"149 this 
freedom does not allow individuals to balance the temporal and 
spiritual interests of other persons: "The state should no more 
allow parents to balance their child's spiritual and temporal in-
terests and decide that they will sacrifice the latter than it should 
allow me to do this in relation to mJ neighbor (or my parents, 
even if they become incompetent.)"1 
Moreover, Dwyer says, the same conclusion follows when 
we consider children's supposed religious interests: for courts to 
assume that children have a need to grow up within a religious 
belief system would be to assume the truth of particular religious 
beliefs, in violation of the Establishment Clause.151 As for chil-
dren's free exercise rights, 
there are obvious problems with attributing to children an in-
terest in religious liberty that would justify allowing them to 
make major life decisions .. inimical to their overall well-
being and especially to their liberty and opportunities 
throughout the rest of their lives. Most children lack the cog-
nitive abilities, knowledge, psychological and emotional inde-
pendence, and self-control necessary for making such momen-
tous life-determining choices, and this is especially true of 
those growing up in an authoritarian, restrictive environment. 
Moreover, placing on children the burden of making such de-
cisions could itself be quite traumatic for them and would no 
doubt induce many parents to take coercive measures to en-
sure that children made the 'right' choice. Thus the consistent 
practice of courts not to base decisions in custody, medical 
148. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 82 (cited in note 8). 
149. !d. at 83. 
150. !d. 
151. !d. at 143. 
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care, school regulation, and other situations on the 'relifious 
liberty' of younger children makes a great deal of sense.15 
187 
In sum, according to Dwyer, the Constitution requires states 
to protect children's temporal interests no matter what the par-
ents believe153 - indeed, no matter what the children believe- un-
til they become adults. The state may consider otherworldly be-
liefs, if at all, only insofar as those beliefs affect the child's 
temporal well-being. For example, state intervention forcing the 
parents or the child to do something they believe will cause the 
child to be damned might cause psychological harm to the 
child.154 As Dwyer makes plain, however, it would be a rare case 
in which this sort of psychological harm outweighed the harms 
he alleges traditionalist religious education inflicts on children. 
B. PARENTAL AUTHORITY TO BALANCE TEMPORAL AND 
SPIRITUAL INTERESTS IS NOT ANOMALOUS 
Before turning to Dwyer's novel interpretation of the Es-
tablishment Clause, I want to deal with his argument that par-
ents' free exercise rights to balance their children's temporal and 
spiritual interests are anomalous and illegitimate. Dwyer rea-
sons by analogy from the fact that one adult has no free exercise 
rights to balance another's temporal and spiritual interests to the 
conclusion that parents shouldn't be allowed to make such 
tradeoffs on behalf of their children. But one adult isn't allowed 
to balance another's various and sometimes conflicting temporal 
interests, either. Parents, however, are allowed and expected to 
balance their child's temporal interests, and even Dwyer 
wouldn't forbid this practice-he'd just make it much easier for 
the state to reverse these parental judgments if it disagreed with 
them. If the analogy between parents and strangers doesn't hold 
for temporal-temporal balancing, why should it hold for tempo-
ral-spiritual balancing? Parents are generally the best guardians 
of their children's best interests, and if spiritual interests are real 
they are obviously of the greatest importance. It is therefore in 
children's best interests to allow their parents, rather than the 
state, to decide whether they have spiritual interests and if so 
what weight they should carry. That is the parentalist intuition 
behind Pierce's assertion that parents have both the right and the 
"high duty ... to recognize and prepare [children] for additional 
152. !d. at 144. 
153. !d. at 83. 
154. !d. at 83-84, 145. 
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obligations"- including, as Yoder spells out, "the inculcation of 
moral standards [and] religious beliefs .... "155 
Parental rights of this kind not only do not contravene the 
Establishment Clause as it has generally been understood in our 
legal culture, they avoid major establishment clause problems. 
Under the traditional parentalist approach, the state neutrally 
abstains from deciding whether and if so what kind of religious 
upbringing the child shall receive, leaving that decision to the 
child's parents. Just as the Religion Clauses leave both religious 
and secular adults free to pursue the good life as they under-
stand it, so too they leave both religious and secular parents free 
to raise their children by their own best lights. Parents of all per-
suasions thus retain the authority to decide what if any spiritual 
or otherworldly interests their child has, and how (within limits) 
these interests should be balanced against (or whether they 
should trump) the child's temporal ones. 
The state, of course, is not responsible for these parental 
choices, any more than it is responsible for all the other chil-
drearing decisions parents make. The state does not endorse re-
ligion by permitting religious parents to raise their child relig-
iously, any more than it endorses atheism by permitting atheists 
to raise their child atheistically. The state has adopted a neutral, 
nondiscriminatory rule that gives the same authority to parents 
of any faith, or no faith. By doing so, the state avoids the Estab-
lishment Clause dilemma that would arise were the state to wield 
this authority itself: the state would either have to decide that 
children's best interests should be defined exclusively in secular 
terms (thereby favoring secularism) or that children's best inter-
ests should include their religious and otherworldly interests 
(thereby favoring religion). 156 
155. 268 U.S. at 535; 406 U.S. at 233. The Yoder opinion adds, "and elements of 
good citizenship." I believe the Yoder Court erred in including civic education within the 
meaning of "additional obligations" as that term was used in Pierce. The more likely 
reading is that "additional obligations" refers to obligations states may not themselves 
legitimately impose: that covers religion but not good citizenship. See Prince v. Massa· 
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (referring to educational obligations "the state can nei-
ther supply nor hinder"). 
156. Consider also legal disputes over decisions concerning formerly competent 
adults. In deciding what the adult would have chosen were he or she still competent, the 
courts use the adult's value system whether or not it was religious. For example, when a 
court determines whether a comatose person would have wanted life-support efforts to 
cease, it attempts to determine the person's actual preferences, including preferences 
based on religious beliefs. If the court refused to do so, it would plainly be discriminating 
against religious persons. Yet under Dwyer's approach, the Establishment Clause might 
well require this sort of discrimination. 
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Dwyer is forced to confront this dilemma because he takes 
the position that state courts should subject parental childrearing 
decisions to de novo review at the state's behest, even if the deci-
sion in question is religiously based. Because, under this ap-
proach, the court is making its own independent judgment about 
the child's best interests, the court must either treat spiritual in-
terests as real or unreal. It has escaped Dwyer that both options 
seem inconsistent with the neutrality the Establishment Clause 
requires. But that is simply one more reason (in addition to 
those discussed in Part I) why we should reject the de novo ap-
proach and retain the parentalist presumption. As the Supreme 
Court put it in Prince v. Massachusetts, under Pierce parents' 
"function and freedom include pregaration for obligations the 
state can neither supply nor hinder."1 
To be sure, even under the parentalist presumption a simi-
lar-albeit smaller and far more manageable-problem arises 
insofar as that presumption is rebuttable. In a case in which par-
ents rely solely on temporal reasons, a court might find the pre-
sumption rebutted if the parents' view was plainly unreasonable. 
But how is a court to apply that approach to a dispute in which 
parents' religious beliefs about their child's spiritual interests 
play a decisive role in their decisionmaking? The conventional 
wisdom, repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court, is that 
courts cannot decide which religious beliefs are unreasonable 
and which pass muster. 158 
One possible solution to this problem is a neutral, bright-
line rule that any parental decision occasioning serious physical 
harm to the child must be overturned, no matter how the parents 
seek to justify it. 159 Under this approach, for example, religious 
parents could not refuse to allow their child to receive a lifesav-
ing blood transfusion. But neither could environmentalist par-
ents refuse to allow their child to receive a lifesaving drug ob-
tainable only from an endangered species. Because the category 
157. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (emphasis added). 
158. In other writing, I have tentatively suggested that there may be extreme cases in 
which the conventional wisdom is wrong, but I shall assume for present purposes that it 
is unqualifiedly correct. See Gilles, 26 Capital U.L. Rev. at 22-24 (cited in note 21). 
159. An alternative approach would be to require the child's consent before giving 
effect to any life-threatening parental choice. This rule would avoid the need for a de-
batable substantive. judgme~t about children's spiritual interests. As applied to young 
ch1ld~en, however, It seems httle dtfferent from a rule leaving these matters to the good-
faith JUdgments of ~arents. I suspect that a regime using parental good faith for young 
chtldren and the child's consent for older children is a good deal more defensible than 
most people think, but a full inquiry into its merits and demerits is beyond the scope of 
thts essay. 
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of serious physical harms includes only temporal injuries, even 
this rule is non-neutral to some extent, and therefore in some 
tension with the Religion Clauses. It amounts to a judgment that 
children have no spiritual interests that outweigh serious threats 
to their lives-a judgment that some religions reject (and that 
some religious adults have rejected when their own lives were at 
stake). Although the question seems very close, such a judgment 
may be defensible on the grounds that there is a consensus in its 
favor in our society (that is, almost everyone would agree with 
it), and that it is the least bad solution to an intractable diffi-
culty.160 
In any event, this narrow judgment, confined to rare cases 
presenting a large risk of serious physical injury or death, is a far 
cry from what Dwyer proposes-a global judgment privileging 
temporal interests over religious ones. Unlike death and irrepa-
rable physical injury, the temporal harms Dwyer alleges tradi-
tionalist religious schools inflict on their students (e.g., repressed 
sexuality, low self-esteem, and sexist attitudes) are plainly re-
versible. Children can and do reject their religious upbringing 
(or these aspects of it) as teenagers or, perhaps more commonly, 
as adults. Equally important, many reasonable people believe 
that the religious values and commands Dwyer condemns are 
beneficial, even (but not only) in temporal terms. There must be 
some limits on parents' authority to occasion temporal harm to 
their children for the sake of spiritual benefits, and it is not easy 
to specify exactly what those limits should be. But that difficulty 
must not be used as a pretext for eradicating parental religious 
authority altogether, on the strength of a highly partisan judg-
ment that children have no spiritual interests that ever outweigh 
their temporal ones. Both relevant policies-maximizing chil-
dren's best interests and minimizing state partiality as between 
religion and secularism-converge in support of a robust paren-
talist presumption that recognizes parents' authority to balance 
children's temporal and spiritual interests. 
160. I do not mean to suggest that a consensus standard is problem-free. To begin 
with, although a court applying a consensus standard would be neutrally evaluating the 
distribution of opinions in the society as a whole, not making a judgment of its own, the 
fact remains that a consensus standard amounts to a supermajoritarian trump on a coun-
termajoritarian (free exercise) right. Moreover, a consensus standard raises difficult 
questions such as what constitutes a consensus (does almost everybody mean 90%, 95 o/o, 
98%, 99%, or 99.9% ?), and deciding how the question is to be framed (e.g., is the ques-
tion whether blood transfusions are spiritually permissible, whether the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses' are clearly wrong in treating blood transfusions as spiritually defiling, or whether 
their position is clearly wrong as applied to children?). 
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C. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOES NOT FORBID STATES 
TO RECOGNIZE PARENTS' AUTHORITY TO BALANCE 
CHILDREN'S TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL INTERESTS 
Although there are many inconsistencies in the Supreme 
Court's Religion Clauses jurisprudence, the Court has stead-
fastly maintained that the Establishment Clause forbids states 
either to promote religion or to subvert it. The Establishment 
Clause adopts a principle of neutrality among religions, and be-
tween religion and secularism. Yet on its face, Dwyer's interpre-
tation of the Establishment Clause is overtly hostile to religion. 
By asserting the authority to decide where children's best inter-
ests lie, while simultaneously positing that children's temporal 
interests always trump their spiritual interests, the state would be 
directing children's lives on the assumption that children's spiri-
tual interests are either spurious or superfluous.161 Furthermore, 
by assuming that children are incapable of making major relig-
iously-based life choices until they become adults, the state 
would be taking the position that all children must live secular 
lives, whatever they and their parents may believe. Taken to-
gether, these prescriptions would establish secularism as the offi-
cial state conception of the good life for children. 
In defense of this interpretation of the Establishment 
Clause, Dwyer offers no argument from text, history, or prece-
dent. Instead, he tries to justify the obvious non-neutrality of his 
approach by reciting the familiar observation that the Estab-
lishment Clause "principle of state neutrality is not itself ideo-
logically neutral," because it takes a partisan, liberal position 
"directly opposed to those religious views that favor state in-
volvement in promoting religious values and causes." 162 The par-
ticular conclusions he reaches, he says, are simply implications of 
161. Though he does not offer it as a theological proposition, it is illuminating to 
consider Dwyer's temporal-interests-only rule in theological terms. One obvious possi-
bility is that Dwyer's rule is an implication of the theological proposition that God does 
not exist. But this need not necessarily be the case. A salient alternative explanation 
runs as follows: if there is a God, and if God establishes rules about how human beings 
should behave, one of those rules is that no child's temporal interests should ever be sac-
rificed except to achieve some greater temporal good. God may or may not require 
adults to sacrifice their own temporal interests for spiritual or otherworldly reasons, but 
God would never require a child to do so. (As for the boundary line between adults and 
children, one must hope our society's legal understanding corresponds to God's.) While 
some religious persons would find this an appealing characterization of God's laws, it is 
clear that others would not. From their standpoint, to claim that God expects no tempo-
raisacnflce from ch1ldren constitutes a profound denial of the very proposition Dwyer 
ms1sts 1s fundamental-the equal personhood of children. 
162. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 82 (cited in note 8). 
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this proposition.163 Remember what those conclusions are: the 
state must regulate childrearing exclusively by reference to chil-
dren's temporal best interests, and therefore any childrearing re-
gime that permits parents to make religiously-based decisions 
adversely affecting their children's temporal welfare, or in which 
children enjoy the freedom to choose a traditionalist religious 
education, violates the Establishment Clause. The core of 
Dwyer's argument, therefore, turns out to be the claim that fur-
nishing these free exercise rights to parents or children consti-
tutes forbidden "state involvement in promoting religious values 
and causes." 
The truth or falsity of that proposition, however, depends 
on what the baseline is for determining whether the state is 
"promoting" religion. Dwyer fails to explain what he thinks the 
appropriate baseline is, let alone offer a reasoned defense of it. 
In fact, none of the three mainstream conceptions of establish-
ment clause neutrality-the "no-aid" theory, the "nondiscrimi-
nation" theory, and the "substantive neutrality" theory164 -sup-
ports Dwyer's claims, and all of them are entirely consistent with 
traditional parental authority over children's religious education. 
Dwyer's position represents a new, fourth theory-what we 
might call the 'substantive nonneutrality' theory-which appears 
to rest solely on Dwyer's passionate (and unproven) conviction 
that traditionalist religion is irrational. 
1. The No-Aid Theory 
A strong no-aid theory would take as its baseline govern-
ment refusal to extend any form of protection, including ordi-
nary civil and political rights and liberties, to religious institu-
tions or religious people. However, as the Supreme Court 
recognized in Everson v. Board of Education165 (and has often 
reaffirmed since), this extreme version of the no-aid theory is 
patently at odds with the Free Exercise Clause. The no-aid the-
ory has never been thought- by the Court, by constitutional 
scholars, or by groups such as the ACLU that have long adopted 
it as their litigating position- to require states to withhold the 
protection of their laws, courts, police, fire departments, or other 
163. Id. at 82-83 ("I will not endeavor to defend this nonneutral principle of state 
neutrality embodied in our federal Constitution but instead simply assume it and expli-
cate its implications for those who endorse it"). 
164. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory 
L.J. 43, 45,48 (1997). 
165. 330U.S.1 (1947). 
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instrumentalities from religious institutions or individuals. 
Rather, the no-aid baseline of government inactivity has been 
interpreted to mean that affirmative government financial sup-
port of religious institutions-especially religious schools-con-
stitutes forbidden aid to religion. Nondiscriminatory govern-
ment financial support to religious individuals, on the other 
hand, has not been seen as aiding religion. As the Court put it in 
Everson, the Free Exercise Clause forbids a state to "exclude in-
dividual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, 
Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any 
other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the 
benefits of public welfare legislation. "166 
Indeed, although the no-aid theory has been especially in-
fluential in its cases dealing with state aid to religious schools, 
the Supreme Court has been increasingly unwilling to charac-
terize nondiscriminatory state benefits to students or parents, 
who may elect to use those benefits to help obtain a religious 
education, as "aid" to religion.167 The crucial factor is that the 
ultimate decision to expend these subsidies on religious rather 
than secular education lies with the beneficiary, not the state. 
Proponents of the no-aid theory have strenuously objected to 
this trend, which is part of the Court's overall shift in recent 
years in the direction of the nondiscrimination theory. Their 
objections, however, have centered on the dangers of allowing 
public tax dollars to flow in large quantities to religious schools. 
To the best of my knowledge, Dwyer is the first scholar to sug-
gest that the state impermissibly "aids" religion merely by re-
fusing to deprive parents of the authority to decide whether their 
child shall receive a religious or secular education, and whether 
their child's best interests shall be determined with religious in-
terests in mind, or exclusively in secular terms. 
2. The Nondiscrimination Theory 
The nondiscrimination theory takes as its baseline the gov-
ernment's treatment of analogous secular activities, and treats 
any discrimination-whether in favor of religion or against it-as 
166. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15·16. 
167. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state tax deduction for educational 
expenses, including tuition at religious schools, does not violate the Establishment 
Clause); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state 
assistance to blind _college student pursui~g training for religious ministry, as part of gen-
eral vocatiOnal assistance program for bhnd college students, does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause). 
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a departure from neutrality.168 It is readily apparent that tradi-
tional parental authority involves no departure from this concep-
tion of establishment clause neutrality. The analogous secular 
activity to religious childrearing is secular childrearing; the tradi-
tional approach treats both activities alike by conferring on all 
parents the authority to decide what set of interests constitutes 
their child's best interests, and how those interests are to be 
ranked or balanced in cases of conflict. If the parents think the 
child's paramount interests are secular, the state defers to their 
secularism. If they think the child's paramount interests are 
spiritual, the state defers to their piety. Indeed, because elimi-
nating parental authority to decide what role religion shall play 
in a child's life would require the state to prefer secular chil-
drearing to religious childrearing (or vice-versa), the nondis-
crimination theory may even imply that parental authority over 
children's religious upbringing is constitutionally required by the 
Establishment Clause. 
3. The Substantive Neutrality Theory 
The substantive neutrality theory, for which Douglas Lay-
cock and Michael McConnell argue, holds that the Religion 
Clauses should be read as a single, coherent provision whose 
goal is to minimize government influence on religious choices, 
thereby maximizin~ individual autonomy in matters of religious 
belief or disbelief. 69 Thus, the substantive neutrality theory 
looks to the incentives that government creates to determine 
whether state action is consistent with the Religion Clauses. Be-
cause evenhanded aid to both religious and secular beneficiar-
ies-whatever form it takes, financial or otherwise-does not 
skew incentives one way or the other, the substantive neutrality 
theory treats it as permissible. Under the substantive neutrality 
theory, therefore, traditional parental authority, creating as it 
does no incentives for parents to choose any particular religion 
or to choose religion over secularism, is unquestionably constitu-
tional. 
168. Laycock, 46 Emory L.J. at 48 (cited in note 164). 
169. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom At a Crossroads, 59 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 115, 117 (1992) ("the purpose of the Religion Clauses is to protect the relig-
ious lives of the people from unnecessary intrusions of government, whether promoting 
or hindering religion. It is to foster a regime of religious pluralism, as distinguished from 
both majoritarianism and secularism"). 
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4. A New Theory of Substantive Non-neutrality? 
Each of the mainstream theories extends robust protection 
to religious liberty in some major sphere of state action.170 And 
all three of these regimes would allow nonmonetary, nondis-
criminatory acknowledgements of parental authority to make 
religiously-motivated childrearing decisions contrary to the 
child's temporal best interests (subject to a neutral rule forbid-
ding serious bodily injury to the child). Dwyer's regime, by con-
trast, would not only forbid "aid" to religion in the form of pa-
rental childrearing authority; direct or indirect financial aid to 
religious schools would be banned insofar as their practices are 
"inconsistent with the temporal well-being of their students,"171 
and states would be barred from granting exemptions from their 
educational and childrearing laws to religious parents (or their 
children). Thus, in direct opposition to the substantive neutral-
ity theory, Dwyer's account of the Religion Clauses seems de-
signed to minimize religious autonomy and maximize govern-
ment influence over religious choices in our society. We might 
call it the "substantive non-neutrality" theory. But whatever we 
call it, this theory is quite bereft of support in historical evidence, 
precedent, or constitutional theory. 
D. CHILDREN'S FREEDOM OF RELIGION INCLUDES THE RIGHT 
TO MAKE DECISIONS CONTRARY TO THEIR TEMPORAL BEST 
INTERESTS 
Dwyer mounts two distinct attacks on the idea that children 
have an interest in religious liberty that justifies allowing them to 
make decisions contrary to their temporal best interests for re-
ligious reasons. In his chapter on equal protection, he argues 
that children are incompetent to exercise such rights because 
they lack the capabilities and knowledge necessary for making 
major, life-determining choices.172 But if children are incompe-
170. Although the no-aid theory restricts the use of financial aid for religious pur-
poses, it often requires accomodation of religion on the grounds that regulation would be 
burdensome. See Laycock, 46 Emory L.J. at 70 (cited in note 164). The nondiscrimina-
tion theory would "produce a regime of nondiscriminatory financial [and nonfinancial] 
aid and no regulatory exemptions." !d. The substantive neutrality theory would produce 
a regime of nondiscriminatory aid and of regulatory exemptions for religious practices 
(unless a religious exemption would create strong incentives to adopt the religion(s) in 
question) -thereby combining the more religion-friendly aspects of the no-aid theory 
and the nondiscrimination theory. Id. at 68-73. 
171. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 181 (cited in note 8). 
172 .. Id. at 144. See also id. at 53 (criticizing Justice Douglas for suggesting that the 
chmce m Yoder should have been left up to the Amish children, in light of "the psycho-
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tent to make these major decisions, then obviously it is necessary 
and appropriate that some adult act on their behalf. Parents are 
the right choice for that role, because they are generally more 
faithful and knowledgeable agents for their children than the 
state, and because the Free Exercise Clause is directed against 
interference with religious liberty by the state, not individuals. 
The argument from incompetence leads to a regime of strong 
parental rights, not to Dwyer's preferred regime of vestigial 
ones. 
In his Original Position analysis, Dwyer takes a different 
tack. He concedes that, giving liberty its ordinary meaning, it is 
"difficult to deny that children are capable of exercising religious 
liberty at a very early age."173 Moreover, he acknowledges that 
even if children don't adequately understand what is at stake, 
"we do not think it appropriate for the state to override adults' 
religious preferences solely because they are based on ignorance 
or incompetence, and it is not clear why we should treat children 
differently in that respect."174 Nevertheless, he argues that chil-
dren's religious preferences should be overridden when they are 
"clearly irrational, in the sense that effectuating them would re-
sult in their suffering greater harm than denying them would 
cause," and contends that a preference for traditionalist religious 
education is irrational.175 But why doesn't that argument, too, 
apply with equal force to the choices of adult believers in tradi-
tionalist religions? An elderly woman gives most of her income 
to the church, insisting on living in squalor and shortening her 
life. A Jehovah's Witness refuses a blood transfusion that would 
save his life. These choices seem plainl~ irrational if the only 
relevant considerations are secular goods. 76 Consequently, if the 
elderly woman's child seeks to challenge her 'excessive charity,' 
or if the attending physician seeks permission to transfuse the 
logical harm that could have resulted from placing these children in the position of hav-
ing to make such a momentous decision, as well as the fact that thirteen-year-olds, par-
ticularly those who have spent their entire lives in an insular, illiberal religious commu-
nity, are probably not capable of making an informed, rational decision about whether 
they should go to school"). 
173. ld. at 164. 
174. ld. 
175. ld. 
176. It is possible to argue that a religious person's fear of divine sanction (or desire 
to please God) may be so powerful that the person is temporally better off complying 
with God's law as he or she understands it. If so, that would supply yet another reason to 
reject Dwyer's conclusions. The text assumes, as does Dwyer: that religi~usly-ba~d sen-
timents or emotions do not trump (although they may sometimes outweigh) maJor tem-
poral interests in life, health, and liberty. 
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Jehovah's Witness, Dwyer's argument implies that the state 
should rule in favor of these claimants. 
But why stop there? Once we begin overriding the express, 
religiously-based choices of individuals-children or adults-on 
the basis of a secular "irrationality" test, there is no logical stop-
ping point. If the state can override a person's religiously-based 
choices any time it thinks them irrational in secular terms, why 
not address the most fundamental choice of all- the choice to 
belong to a traditionalist religious community? As we have al-
ready seen, Dwyer's indictment implies that religious tradition-
alism is harmful to adult believers as well as to their children. 
Under his approach, even if the Free Exercise Clause forbids the 
state to penalize persons for subscribing to these irrational be-
liefs, the state should be able to disband religious congregations 
that threaten their members with damnation should they defect. 
No doubt Dwyer would disavow these consequences, which 
are utterly alien to our constitutional tradition of religious lib-
erty. The point, however, is that his secular "irrationality" crite-
rion sets up the state as arbiter of whether religious beliefs and 
practices are in the self-interest of persons of faith (adults and 
children alike). Whatever else it means, the Free Exercise 
Clause unquestionably precludes the state from engaginJ in 
purely paternalistic regulation of religiously-based conduct.1 
Dwyer might reply that the state causes severe psychologi-
cal injury when it overrides the religious choices of competent 
adults on paternalistic grounds, and that this temporal harm ex-
plains why states refrain from pressing paternalism that far. The 
same reasoning, however, should also apply to state interference 
with children's religiously-based decisions. Indeed, Dwyer ad-
mits it is "indisputable that forcing a child to do something that 
he believes will displease God can be traumatic. "178 He tries to 
wriggle out of this problem by denying that most regulation of 
religious schools will have this effect, on the grounds that the 
regulation is directed at teachers and parents, not at children.179 
177. If there are any exceptions to this generalization, they involve situations in 
which it would be very hard to sort out a purely paternalistic justification from a harm-to-
third-parties justification. For example, a ban on religious human sacrifice, even if the 
persons to be sacrificed were adults who believed they would benefit by being sacrificed, 
might rest on a judgment that these persons are deluded about their own best interests. 
But that judgment is difficult to separate from a judgment that cruel practices of this kind 
could spawn copy-cat behavior, or a judgment that the discomfort of others with such 
practices is so great that they should be forbidden. 
178. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 145 (cited in note 8). 
179. Id. 
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But the consequence of those regulations would be to hinder 
traditionalist religious children from learning the precepts of the 
faith they are seeking to embrace, and require them to be taught 
values contrary to that faith. Such conflicts would be pervasive 
under Dwyer's scheme of regulation. Children who want sexual 
modesty would be forced to endure graphic sex education.180 
Children who want to deepen their understanding and apprecia-
tion of the traditional family would be taught that traditional 
families are sexist and unjust.181 Children who want to learn the 
Biblical account of creation would be taught that it has been su-
perseded by a scientific one. 
Even Dwyer admits that problems such as these will some-
times arise (though, as we have just seen, he understates their 
frequency and importance). He responds that religious parents 
will "act to alleviate the children's concerns, reassuring them 
that they are not responsible for things that the state compels."182 
This rationale, however, would support intrusive paternalistic 
regulation of religious adults as well: their suffering is minimal, 
the argument would go, for they can console themselves with the 
reflection that God will not punish them for violating his com-
mands under threat of force. One can imagine Torquemada 
embracing this reasoning with gusto. 
180. See Hot, Sexy and Safer v. Brown, 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). . 
181. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th CJT. 
1987). 
182. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 146 (cited in note 8). 
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IV. DOES THE EQUAL PROTECfiON CLAUSE 
PROHIBIT EXEMPTIONS FROM STATE EDUCATIONAL 
REGULATIONS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND 
PARENTS? 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF DWYER'S EQUAL PROTECTION 
ANALYSIS 
Dwyer's fourth main thesis is that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits states from exempting religious schools and 
parents from state child-welfare laws, including state education 
laws. Currently, he says, states grant regulatory exemptions to 
religious schools and parents in three ways: some state educa-
tional requirements apply only to public schools; others exempt 
religious schools; and yet others extend only to schools that re-
ceive specified types of state aid.183 He views each type of ex-
emption as equivalent to a failure to regulate the choices and 
practices of religious schools and parents-and thus necessarily 
also a failure to extend to children in religious schools the same 
educational protections and entitlements afforded to children in 
public schools. For despite the fact that "education is an essen-
tial good that states undertake to guarantee to all children,"184 
these exemptions give parents "the right to decide whether the 
children will attend a school to which the statutory protections 
extend or one to which they do not."185 Thus, Dwyer suggests, a 
proper analogy to state education law would be a hypothetical 
welfare assistance law giving religious leaders the legal right to 
decide whether their adult followers will receive the welfare 
benefits or will instead receive some private alternative that may 
be markedly inferior.186 Like this hypothetical law, religious ex-
emptions to education laws illegitimately empower some persons 
to deprive other persons of benefits the state guarantees to all 
other similarly situated individuals.187 
Dwyer also argues that state sex discrimination laws that 
apply only to public schools present an additional equal protec-
tion problem. It would clearly be unconstitutional, he says, for 
public schools to enga~e in the sexist practices conservative re-
ligious schools display. 88 States provide substantial material as-
183. Id. at 122. 
184. Id. at 125. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 126. 
188. Id. 
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sistance to religious schools, ranging from tax-exempt status to 
providing textbooks and transportation. He argues that this 
state aid, when coupled with states' failure to prohibit gender 
discrimination and gender bias in religious schools, amounts to 
encouragement of these discriminatory practices:189 indeed, he 
says, the Supreme Court reasoned in Norwood v. Harrison 19Q that 
merely providing textbooks to private schools that engaged in 
race discrimination constituted forbidden state encouragement. 
Having argued that religious exemptions to education laws 
amount to discriminatory state action, Dwyer then turns to the 
question of what level of equal protection scrutiny courts should 
apply. He urges that strict scrutiny is appropriate. "Children of 
religious objectors arguably have less political power than any 
other group in this country, less than even illegitimate or alien 
children" -groups to whom the Supreme Court has applied 
heightened scrutiny. 191 Like all children, children of religious 
objectors cannot influence the political process themselves. In 
addition, their parents, who would ordinarily be expected to rep-
resent their temporal interests in the public sphere, in fact advo-
cate against those interests for religious reasons. 192 
Finally, Dwyer argues that none of the possible justifica-
tions for religious exemptions from education and child welfare 
laws is compelling-and some are not even legitimate. As he 
sees it, the actual purpose of these exemptions is to gratify par-
ents' religious preferences regardless of children's welfare; that 
constitutes an illegitimate naked preference for parents over 
children. 193 Nor can legislatures claim they are merely respecting 
parents' constitutional rights, because many exemptions go be-
yond what courts have held to be constitutionally required. 194 
Most importantly, he says, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that the Equal Protection Clause is "a higher-order constraint on 
judicial interpretation of substantive constitutional rights. "195 
But the Court has failed to heed that command in the context of 
childrearing, where it has deferred to the interests of parents in 
religious liberty rather than ensuring that the interests of their 
children receive equal protection under law. "An equal protec-
189. Id. at 127. 
190. 413 u.s. 455 (1973). 
191. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 133 (cited in note 8). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 137. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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tion perspective thus leads to the startling conclusion that the 
Yoder decision, that icon of liberalism and free exercise juris-
prudence ... was actually itself unconstitutional. It is for chil-
dren of religious objectors what Plessy v. Ferguson was for Afri-
can-Americans-the Supreme Court's imprimatur upon 
discriminatory laws that foster subordination and social isola-
tion, made to seem reasonable bX a perfunctory dismissal of the 
interests of the disfavored class." 96 
B. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE PERMITS 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM STATE EDUCATION 
LAWS 
1. DISCRIMINATORY STATE ACTION? 
Dwyer's claim that religious exemptions from state educa-
tion laws constitute discriminatory state action is based on a 
clearly erroneous characterization of these statutes. The bulk of 
state education law is designed to specify the contents and prac-
tices of public education, and as such is inapplicable to all private 
education, religious or not. Thus, except in the relatively un-
usual cases in which a state law applies to both public and pri-
vate schools-but exempts religious schools-there is no dis-
crimination on the basis of religion. 
In addition, contrary to what Dwyer assumes, state regula-
tion of public education need not-and typically does not-in-
corporate a legislative judgment that every child's education 
should conform to the public-school model. 197 Consider a law 
requiring sex education in public schools. The scope of this law 
can be explained by other, narrower judgments: the legislature 
may have believed that most parents who send their children to 
public schools want them to receive sex education as part of 
their formal education; it may have believed that a majority of 
the public wants children to receive sex education, and is entitled 
to have its preferences carried out because it is footing the bill 
for public education; or it may simply have decided to defer to 
196. !d. at 138. 
197. Indeed, it is far from clear that most laws and regulations determining the con-
tent and character of public education reflect a legislative judgment about children's best 
interests-as contrasted with the best interests of education bureaucrats, teachers, public-
school parents, publishers, and other producer and consumer interests. Dwyer never 
tells us how it is that the same legislators who callously disregard the welfare of children 
in religious schools vigilantly strive to advance the welfare of children in public schools. 
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the judgment of public school educators and administrators that 
sex education is a good thing for their students. In none of these 
cases could it fairly be said that the legislature has determined 
that sex education is in every child's best interests. 
By contrast, some education laws-for example, compulsory 
schooling laws and statutes specifying subjects that every child 
shall learn (regardless of what kind of school the child attends) 
-do rest on a judgment that their requirements are in every 
child's best interest. These laws, however, typically contain no 
exemptions for religious schools or religious objectors-or, if 
they do, the exemptions merely duplicate the constitutional pro-
tections religious parents are entitled to under Pierce and Yo-
der.I9B 
So Dwyer vastly exaggerates the extent to which state leg-
islatures voluntarily exempt religious parents and their children 
from state educational requirements that the legislature judges 
to be to be in every child's best interests. Nevertheless, it may 
sometimes be the case that a state education law reflecting such 
a legislative judgment exempts religious schools and parents 
from compliance even though requirin& compliance would not 
be unconstitutional under current law. If we focus on these 
elective state exemptions, is Dwyer correct that they constitute 
discrimination against children of religious objectors? Not if the 
statutory exemptions are read in light of the parentalist pre-
sumption (which, although constitutionalized by Pierce, has its 
origins in state common law): the demands of formal equality 
are satisfied because each child's parents are authorized to de-
cide which sort of education is in his or her best interest- a pub-
lic one that complies with the state's substantive educational 
standards or a religious one that does not.200 Looking at state law 
198. See, e.g., Iowa's "Amish exemption," which provides for exemption "from 
compliance with any or all requirements of the compulsory education law and the educa-
tional standards law" for children belonging to religious denominations that profess 
"principles or tenets that differ substantially from the objectives, goals, and philosophy of 
education embodied in [state educational] standards." Iowa Code Annotated § 299.24 
(West, 1996). The Iowa Supreme Court has construed this exemption as available only 
to persons constitutionally entitled to accomodation under Yoder. See Johnson v. Char-
les City Community Schools Bd. of Ed., 368 N.W. 2d 74,83-85 (Iowa 1985). 
199. Of course, if Dwyer's interpretation of the equal protection clause were ac-
cepted in its entirety, the Constitution would never require states to exempt religious 
schools or parents from compliance with state educational requirements that seek to ad-
vance children's welfare. 
200. As for Dwyer's welfare-benefits hypothetical, the decisive difference is that 
some adult must make choices on each child's behalf, and it is both legitimate and wise to 
assign that role to parents. There is no such necessity to empower religious leaders to 
make binding choices about state-provided benefits on behalf of their adult followers. If 
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as a whole, rather than at one statute in isolation, the legislative 
judgment that emerges is that the statutory requirements are in 
children's best interests unless their parents disagree. That is not 
discriminatory state action-it is a sensible judgment that par-
ents are better placed than the legislature to make the ultimate 
determination about their own child's best interests. 
2. Strict scrutiny? 
Even if we assume that religious exemptions constitute dis-
criminatory state action vis-a-vis children of religious objectors, 
Dwyer fails to make the case for heightened scrutiny. As he 
recognizes, children's interests are represented in the public 
sphere by their parents-and it certainly cannot be said that par-
ents are a powerless minority. Thus, Dwyer's argument boils 
down to the claim that conservative religious parents should be 
seen as unfaithful representatives for equal protection purposes 
because they put their children's spiritual interests above their 
temporal ones. As I showed in Part II, however, a good case can 
be made that the religious childrearing commands with which 
Dwyer takes issue are in fact in children's temporal best inter-
ests. Even if a particular religious doctrine entails some sacrifice 
of children's temporal interests, that consequence is problematic 
only if the Constitution compels states to assume that children's 
only true interests are temporal ones. Dwyer does not contend 
that the Equal Protection Clause speaks to that question; his ar-
gument for that secularist proposition rests entirely on the Es-
tablishment Clause. But as I showed in Part III, his interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause is untenable. The Religion 
Clauses do not forbid (and may in fact require) states to recog-
nize parents' authority to take their children's spiritual welfare 
into account in determining their overall best interests. 
C. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FROM LAWS BANNING SEX 
DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION DO NOT VIOLATE EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
In order adequately to appreciate how extreme Dwyer's po-
sition on "sexist education" and "sexist teaching" is, it is neces-
sary to understand what he means by these terms. According to 
Dwyer, education qualifies as "sexist" if children are taught that 
the traditional sexual division of labor, in which the husband is 
religious followers think it is in their best interests to give their religious leaders this sort 
of authority, they are free to do so by private agreement. 
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breadwinner and the wife is childrearer and homemaker, is best 
for men and women-and for their children.201 To be sure, 
Dwyer also claims that many religious schools go farther- for 
example, teaching children that "females, though equal before 
the law and capable of being self-supporting, are inferior to 
males in God's eyes."202 Now, if Dwyer had evidence that some 
religious schools teach that women should not be equal before 
the law, he would presumably present it. We can therefore as-
sume that traditionalist religious schools, across the spectrum of 
belief, acknowledge the civil and political equality of women. 
Where's the sexism in that? 
As for the proposition that women are inferior to men in 
God's eyes, it is hard to see how that can be tenable within any 
Christian community. Every traditionalist Christian denomina-
tion of which I am aware holds that both women and men are 
endowed with free will, immortal souls, and the capacity to at-
tain eternal salvation. Are we supposed to believe women are 
nevertheless inferior in God's eyes because, to take two salient 
examples, Southern Baptist wives are called upon to obey their 
husbands, or because women cannot be ordained as Catholic 
priests? The Southern Baptists and the Catholic Church deny 
that any such implication follows,203 and it would be more than a 
little odd to substitute Dwyer's judgment for theirs on a theo-
logical issue of this kind. 
Dwyer's true concern is not with God's perspective, but 
with man's. Dwyer believes that traditional gender roles lead 
women to perceive themselves as inferior to men, and men to 
perceive themselves as superior to women; and he would no 
doubt cling to that judgment no matter what the traditions that 
endorse these roles might say. Thus, he would label "sexist" any 
religious teaching that endorses what he calls "traditional subor-
dinate roles for women"204 -even if it simultaneously declared 
201. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 16 (cited in note 8). See also id. at 87. 
202. Id. at 176 (criticizing Rawls for tolerating such practices). 
203. The controversial resolution on marriage adopted by the Southern Baptist Con-
vention on June 9, 1998, provides, in pertinent part: "The husband and wife are of equal 
worth before God, since both are created in God's image. The marriage relationship 
models the way God relates to his people. A husband is to love his wife as Christ loved 
the church. He has the God-given responsibility to provide for, to protect and to lead his 
family. A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband 
even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ. She, being in the image of 
God as is her husband and thus equal to him, has the God-given responsibility to respect 
her husband and to serve as his helper in managing the household and nurturing the next 
generation." Baton Rouge Advocate, 1998 WL 4910361 (Aug. 29, 1998). 
204. P. 16. 
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that females are equal to males. But this pejorative label does 
not rest on evidence that being a full-time mother and home-
maker in a conservative religious family is intended to involve 
subordination. Certainly that is not the teaching of Fundamen-
talist-Protestant Christianity, Roman Catholicism, or Orthodox 
Judaism. For all their diversity, these religions share a common 
emphasis on the centrality (indeed, the holiness) of family life. 
From their perspective, the work people do in the marketplace, 
or the influence they exert in political affairs, is in no way supe-
rior to or more important than the work parents do in the home, 
especially childrearing.205 Fairly interpreted, the traditionalist as-
signment of childrearing and home economics primarily to 
mothers, and paid work and political activity primarily to fa-
thers, is predicated on the understanding that both roles are of 
great intrinsic worth and dignity. We might call this view "tradi-
tionalist" (not "traditional"!) feminism." It celebrates chil-
drearing and homemaking, and asserts that although our society 
may have wronged women by discriminating against them in the 
workplace, it wrongs them even more when it devalues the work 
they have traditionally done in nurturing their children and pro-
viding a home for their families. 
No doubt conventional feminists would raise a variety of 
objections to this position, as they surely would to the related 
claim that, on the whole, their brand of feminism has made chil-
dren in our society significantly worse off. To my mind, few de-
bates are more interesting and important than this one, and 
there are important and substantial arguments on both sides. 
Rather than engage those arguments, however, Dwyer simply 
treats the conventional feminist position as axiomatically correct 
on one issue after another, ranging from the foundational prem-
ise that traditional gender roles constrain women "to a life of 
subordination"206 to the predictable conclusion that "sexist edu-
cation" leads to "diminished self-esteem, inhibited cognitive de-
velopment, passivity, reduced aspirations, and lower achieve-
ment on the part of female students. "207 This is ideology posing 
205. Midge Deeter has memorably summarized this traditionalist ideal of childrear-
ing: "Every child is born to two people, one of his own sex and one of the other, to whom 
his life is as imponant as their own and who undertake to instruct him in the ways of the 
world around him. Can you name the social reformer who could dream of a better ar-
rangement than that?" The Madness of the American Family, Policy Review 33, 37 
(Sept.-Oct., 1998) (emphasis in original). 
206. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 146 (cited in note 8). 
207. ld. at 10 (emphasis added). 
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as empiricism.208 If you define wanting a career (or a career and 
a family) as a higher aspiration than just wanting a family, you 
will have no trouble proving that girls who are taught to avoid 
careerism suffer from "reduced aspirations." 
In short, in order to establish that traditionalist religious 
education is either "sexist" or "harmful" to girls, Dwyer is forced 
to rely on feminist standards that many (if not most) people in 
our society do not accept. His discussion of existing state and 
federal laws concerning sex discrimination in education tries to 
solve this problem by suggesting that Congress and many state 
legislatures have already decided to forbid "sexist education" 
broadly and stringently conceived. But the attempt fails, once 
again because Dwyer mischaracterizes the legal position. To 
support his contention that states regulate sexist teaching, he 
notes that some states (six, according to his accompanying foot-
note) have mandated that public schools eliminate sex discrimi-
nation in textbooks and instructional materials.209 Taken at face 
value, this means that forty-four states have no such provisions 
even for their public schools. Even in states that do, the statute 
proves no more than that the legislature has decided to forbid 
public schools to adopt a policy of steering girls toward mar-
riage, motherhood, childrearing and homemaking. The relevant 
question, however, is whether the legislature believed that the 
parents of children in public schools should be forbidden to en-
gage in precisely that kind of steering-and no state has a law to 
that effect. If parents may instruct their children in traditional 
gender roles at home, why may they not send them to a private 
school that will provide equivalent instruction in the classroom? 
Dwyer's errors in describing federal law are even more seri-
ous. He asserts that there is a federal "prohibition against sex 
discrimination and sexist teaching in elementary and secondary 
schools" that accept federal aid (emphasis added).210 The statute 
208. Dwyer claims that "[v]oluminous research" supports the judgment that "sexist 
education and denial of equal opportunity based on gender are harmful to female stu-
dents," (id. at 10) and he cites a number of studies in an accompanying footnote. (Id. at 
184 n.9) But he tells us nothing about the methodology of these studies, the magnitude 
of the effects they found, how they defined harm to female students, and what specific 
sexist or discriminatory teachings and practices were being studied. Especially in light of 
the well-documented abuses to which self-esteem "studies" have proved vulnerable in 
the hands of feminist advocacy groups, see Christina Hoff Summers, Who Stole Femi-
nism? How Women Have Betrayed Women 137-56 (Simon & Schuster, 1994), readers 
are entitled to know why these sources qualify as "research" rather than as advocacy 
pieces. 
209. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 183 n.7 (cited in note 8). 
210. Id. at 9. 
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in question-Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972-
forbids sex discrimination, and Dwyer claims that its language is 
"broad enough to encompass sexist teaching."211 Buried in a 
footnote, however, is his acknowledgment that the "implement-
ing regulations ... exclude sexist textbooks and curricular mate-
rials from their coverage."212 In the face of vague statutory lan-
guage, of course, the implementing regulations are ordinarily 
dispositive of a provision's legal meaning, and Dwyer cites no 
case rejecting the regulations on this point. Thus, under Title IX 
even public schools may engage in "sexist teaching" without for-
feiting federal aid-and Title IX specifically exempts from its 
coverage any "educational institution which is controlled by a 
religious organization if the application of this subsection would 
not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organiza-
tion. "213 
Accordingly, Dwyer's claim that current state and federal 
laws express a legislative judgment that "sexist education" is 
harmful to female students is plainly wrong. But that still leaves 
his contention that "it would clearly be unconstitutional for state 
schools to engage in sexist practices" such as sexist education, 
even if they did so on purely secular grounds. 214 (Were this true, 
Title IX would violate the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment's due process clause, because it permits fed-
eral funds to flow to public schools that engage in sexist teach-
ing.) The nub of this argument is that "sexist education" -i.e., 
teaching children in public schools that traditional gender roles 
are in their best interests-constitutes invidious discrimination in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. That proposition is 
wrong because, as we have already seen, Dwyer cannot show 
that traditional gender roles are harmful to girls (or boys); 
opinion on that value-laden question remains deeply divided in 
our society. The Constitution permits the majority, and the 
public schools, to endorse traditional gender roles, to endorse 
feminist attacks on those roles, or to adopt some compromise 
position. 
211. ld. 
212. ld. at 183 n.5. 
213. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1994). Dwyer implies that this provision of Title IX is 
unconstitutional. See Dwyer, Religious Schools at 123 (cited in note 8). 
214. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 126 (cited in note 8). Dwyer's claim here rests on 
the Equal Protection Clause, not on the Establishment Clause. Obviously public schools 
could not encourage girls to accept traditional gender roles by inculcating the religious 
doctnnes that support those positions. The question is whether public schools are for-
bidden to endorse traditional gender roles on secular grounds. 
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Suppose, however, that "sexist teaching" in public schools 
should be treated on a par with racist teaching in public schools, 
which the Equal Protection Clause may well forbid. 215 It still 
would not follow that private and religious schools cannot en-
gage in sexist teaching. To Dwyer's extravagant claim that the 
effects of "sexist instruction" on girls are comparable to the ef-
fects of racially segregated schooling on African-American chil-
dren, there is a simple answer: Runyon v. McCrary. 216 In Run-
yon, the Supreme Court struck down the racially discriminatory 
admissions policies of a private school (though on the basis of 
section 1981, rather than on equal protection grounds). But in 
reaching that conclusion, the Court unequivocally "assumed that 
parents have a First Amendment right to send their children to 
educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segre-
gation is desirable, and that the children have an equal right to 
attend such institutions."217 The plain message of Runyon-a de-
cision Dwyer does not see fit to mention-is that racist teaching 
is constitutionally protected. A fortiori, sexist teaching must be 
constitutionally protected as well. 
Runyon also demonstrates why Dwyer's reliance on Nor-
wood v. Harrison is unavailing. Even on the dubious assumption 
that Norwood applies outside the context of intentional racial 
discrimination, that decision suggests only that states would be 
forbidden to provide aid such as free textbooks to children at-
tending religious schools that engage in sexist teaching. The pri-
vate schools in Norwood were free to continue their racist prac-
tices; they simply could not do so while receiving this type of 
state support. Thus, Norwood provides no support for Dwyer's 
proposals, which would require religious schools to abandon the 
teaching of sexist beliefs even if they accepted no state aid of any 
kind. 
Mention of Runyon-and of the First Amendment-leads 
me to a larger point about both Dwyer's equal protection analy-
215. The qualification is necessary because most individual-rights provisions of the 
Constitution limit coercive government action, but do not limit government speech. For 
example, the government cannot censor political speech, but it can endorse some politi-
cal views and criticize others. The principal exception is the Establishment Clause, which 
forbids governments to endorse religious views even in the absence of coercive effects. 
See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962); see also Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: 
The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 933 (1986). It may be that 
the Equal Protection Clause is another exception, at least in the case of racist govern-
ment speech in the context of education, on the ground that such speech would have 
gravely harmful effects on minority children. 
216. 427 u.s. 160 (1976). 
217. 427 U.S. at 176. 
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sis and his other arguments for extensive state regulation of the 
content of religious education. Most of his specific proposals in-
volve content-based restrictions on the speech of religious 
schools and religious parents to their students and children. 
States would, inter alia, impose "curricular and teaching guide-
lines," forbid sexist teaching and the teaching of chastity, outlaw 
"teaching secular subjects from a religious perspective," and 
enjoin schools from teaching students "unreasonable, divinely 
ordained standards of conduct."218 Moreover, Dwyer would ex-
tend at least some of these restrictions to direct speech by par-
ents to their children.219 Both types of restrictions are, in the end, 
restrictions on the educative speech of parents: as I have argued 
elsewhere, the speech of parentally-chosen schools and teachers 
is simply indirect educative speech running from parents to chil-
dren through the parents' agents and intermediaries.220 
The religious speech of parents and the schools to which 
they entrust their children is plainly entitled to a high degree of 
first amendment protection. The category of religious educative 
speech implicates not only free speech,221 but also freedom of as-
sociation and the free exercise of religion. Indeed, this category 
of speech can be seen as a subcategory of political speech, be-
cause it involves the formation of children's beliefs and opinions, 
and hence their future character as citizens. But whether we la-
bel it political or simply religious, it is clear that government 
cannot impose viewpoint-based restrictions on what parents 
(and their proxies) say to their children (or on what the children 
say to them). Viewpoint-based regulation of high-value speech 
is subject to a stringent compellin§ state interest test that makes 
it virtually per se unconstitutional. 22 
Dwyer never acknowledges this formidable constitutional 
obstacle to his plan to subject religious speech to children to 
pervasive state censorship and control. If he had, he would pre-
sumably have responded that there is a compelling state interest 
218. Dwyer, Religious Schools at 179 (cited in note 8). 
219. See id. at 158 (suggesting that schools and parents "might justifiably be pro-
scribed from expressing sexist views in the presence of children in a way that damages 
ch1ldren's self-esteem (i.e. such expression could be deemed to fall within legal defini-
tiOns of psychological and emotional abuse in child welfare laws now in place)"). 
220. Gilles, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1015-19 (cited in note 21). 
221. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446 
(1995) ("private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully 
protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression"). 
222. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("It is axio-
matic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or 
the message it conveys." (internal citation omitted)). 
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in preventing harm to children, whether that harm is inflicted by 
means of speech or otherwise. Provided the harm in question is 
sufficiently serious and clear-cut, of course, this point is entirely 
correct: for example, a state might be justified in defining child 
abuse to include an unrelenting parental campaign of cruel and 
hateful speech directed at a child. As we have seen again and 
again throughout this essay, however, the problem is that Dwyer 
defines harm in broad ideological terms with which it is emi-
nently possible reasonably to disagree. This approach is impos-
sible to reconcile with the standard first amendment view that 
"to permit one side of a debatable public question to have a mo-
nopoly in expressi~ its views ... is the antithesis of constitu-
tional guarantees." If the government can forbid parents and 
teachers to communicate any message it decides (based on 
value-laden and highly debatable criteria) is "harmful to chil-
dren," then the government can control the transmission of ideas 
to future generations. Government power of that kind flatly 
contradicts the first amendment principle-announced in a case 
involving the education of religious children-that "no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."224 
CONCLUSION 
Religious Schools v. Children's Rights was plainly written 
out of concern for children's best interests and conviction that 
children suffer serious harm when they receive a traditionalist 
religious education. But although Dwyer's insistence on chil-
dren's best interests as the benchmark for regulation of child-
rearing is illuminating at times, the radical reforms he proposes 
would disserve the best interests of children while trampling on 
their parents' religious liberty and freedom of speech. Making 
aggressive, coercive use of government power to subvert tradi-
tionalist religious education would be imprudent as well as intol-
erant. When, in a liberal democracy, one side's deepest values 
and commitments clash with the other's on a wide range of pub-
lic issues, the result is culture war. When one side tries to take 
away the other side's children by force-whether of arms or law, 
223. Madison Joint School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 
u.s. 167,175-76 (1976). 
224. West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). For the ar-
gument that even as currently constituted our system of public education contravenes the 
Barnette principle, see Stephen Arons, Compelling Belief: The Culture of Amertcan 
Schooling 189-221 (U. of Massachusetts Press, 1986). 
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and whether by abducting or indoctrinating them- the result is 
all too likely to be battles of a less metaphorical kind. 
